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Abstract 
 
The term ‘Wahhabi’ has been applied to a variety of forms of Islam, across various 
geographical locations, and is often associated with radical Islamic groups that 
actually have little or no connection to the ideology that Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab espoused. However, the involvement of Saudi nationals in the 9/11 attacks 
has led to Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Arabia coming under intense scrutiny, and 
requires us to have a greater understanding of the core tenets of Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s teachings. The decade since 9/11 has been characterised by polemical 
discussions of Islam, and current representations of Wahhabi Islam are dominated by 
the ‘clash of civilisations’ attitude. Most accounts therefore reveal little about the 
true nature of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine, and leave no room for the possibility of 
his dawa being a peaceful or socially beneficial tradition. My aim is to explore the 
origins and development of Wahhabi Islam, comparing Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
interpretation of Islam to that of other Islamic thinkers, and examining its place in 
the modern Islamic milieu in order to evaluate the claims of those who say that it is, 
in whole or in part, responsible for the rise of global terrorism. 
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1. Introduction 
The term ‘Wahhabi’ is often associated with radical Islamic groups that actually 
have little or no connection to the ideology that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab espoused, and 
has been applied to a variety of forms of Islam, across various geographical 
locations. Most accurately, Wahhabi Islam in its purest form is the official Islam of 
Saudi Arabia, but financial aid and missionary effort originating from the Arabian 
Gulf has spread this ideology to all areas of the globe. The Saudi citizenship held by 
the majority of the September 11
th
, 2001 attackers has led to the attribution of this, 
and other terrorist acts to Wahhabi doctrine. This accusation requires us to have a 
deeper understanding of what Wahhabi Islam is, and what practices it sanctions, in 
order that we can make an informed decision about the supposed danger posed by 
this type of Islam. The involvement of Saudi nationals in the 9/11 attacks led Saudi 
Arabia to reaffirm its alliance with Western countries. Also considered an ally during 
the Gulf War of 1990-91, Saudi Arabia has backed the US-led ‘war on terror’ since 
its instigation in 2001, allowing many thousands of US troops to be based on its soil. 
However, Saudi organisations and charities have been connected with the financing 
of terrorist organisations, including Osama bin Laden’s network1, and Saudi-backed 
Wahhabi clerics have also been accused of targeting American Muslims for terrorist 
recruitment
2
. 
The decade since 9/11 has been characterised by polemical discussions of Islam, 
with religious and political opinions deeply rooted on every side of the debate. “If 
aggressive hyperbole is one journalistic mode commonly used to describe...Islam 
generally, the other is misapplied euphemism, usually stemming from ignorance but 
often deriving from a barely concealed ideological hostility”3. This antagonism and 
misinformation denies people on all sides the opportunity to reinterpret the issues for 
themselves, and to accept that the problems and their solutions are constantly 
evolving. The ‘clash of civilisations’ theory which has abounded in recent years is 
fundamentally flawed, and actually serves to justify the claims of those members of 
society, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who have a propensity for extremist thinking 
and even violent action. Current representations of Wahhabi Islam are dominated by 
                                                          
1
 Rashid (2002) Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia p.225   
2
 Hamm (2009) ‘Prison Islam in the Age of Sacred Terror’, in British Journal of Criminology, p.667 
3
 Said (1997) Covering Islam p.114 
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this clash of civilisations outlook that cultivates prejudice and fear, and are 
recognisable as distinctly pre- and post-9/11. Most accounts reveal little about the 
true nature of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine, and leave no room for the possibility of 
Wahhabism being a peaceful or socially beneficial tradition. 
As early as 1997, Said wrote about how, “the jihad (holy war) motif...has become 
the single most important motif in Western media representations of Islam”4. Yet the 
frequent translation of jihad into the phrase ‘holy war’, so often seen in popular 
media accounts, is reductionist as it ignores the depth of meaning conveyed by the 
word. Jihad represents a Muslim’s struggle to live life according to God, and this 
effort can be internal or external. While jihad is a duty for every Muslim, perceptions 
of what this includes differ. In particular, the connection of such a struggle with 
physical force is something emphasised by terrorist movements, but rejected by the 
majority of Muslims. Since jihad is frequently made synonymous with terrorism
5
, it 
may be more helpful to think of terrorist action by Muslims as an act of hirabah 
(warfare) instead of jihad. Deriving from the Arabic root harb meaning war or 
combat, the term hirabah would free the non-violent language of Islam, including 
the word jihad, from co-optation by terrorists wishing to justify their acts
6
. Equally, 
the word qital (fighting) could be used in place of jihad. 
Similar issues arise when trying to define terrorism itself. Fisk notes how the term 
‘terrorist’ can be “as dangerous as it [is] misleading”7, since “...’terrorism’ no longer 
means terrorism. It is not a definition; it is a political contrivance. ‘Terrorists’ are 
those who use violence against the side that is using the word... To adopt the word 
means that we have taken a side...”8 Often attempts at a definition fall short of 
encompassing all forms of terrorism, or are so broad as to include acts which may 
not be considered terrorism by all parties. However, a common denominator in 
definitions is that terrorism is an activity which is politically motivated. As such, it 
can be seen as being used by those who are politically powerless and 
disenfranchised. It may occur within a country, or transcend state boundaries. It is 
also a premeditated phenomenon, as according to the European Union’s definition, 
                                                          
4
 Ibid., p114 
5
 Abualrub (2003) Muhammad Ibn Abdil Wahhab: His Life-Story and Mission p.324 
6
 ‘Hirabah’ in Esposito (2009) Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World 
7
 Fisk (1990) Pity the Nation p.435 
8
 Ibid., p.441 
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terrorist groups are structured and not randomly formed
9
. The new forms of global 
terrorism which have emerged since the beginning of the twenty-first century are 
marked by ‘spectacular’ events, where the aim, apart from to instil fear and alter 
political situations, is to capture the attention of the worldwide media. 
One other use of terminology needs clarifying, and that is the use of the words 
‘Wahhabi’ and ‘Wahhabism’ to denote the philosophies and intellectual heritage of 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The term Wahhabi was first used by opponents of Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s dawa (call to Islam) to isolate his interpretation of Islam from other forms, 
and to denigrate his followers on the basis that they were considered followers not of 
Islam, but of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself. The term which Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
preferred to use was muwahiddun (unitarians or monotheists)
10
, as this points to the 
most important characteristic of their belief
11. However, Algar is critical of this “self-
awarded title” as he feels it implies the dismissal of all other Muslims as polluted by 
shirk (idolatry or associating other beings with God)
12
. Indeed, the basis of Islam as 
a whole is tawhid (monotheism), and so the term muwahiddun does not adequately 
distinguish those who adhere to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine from other Muslims. 
Similarly, the word salafist (a follower of the pious ancestors of Islam) is too vague 
to be used in this context, since whilst Wahhabi Islam is salafist, not all salafists are 
Wahhabis. As the term had become commonplace by the early nineteenth century
13
, 
and due to its familiarity, ‘Wahhabi’ is generally accepted as legitimate14. “The term 
Wahhabi...has also become part of the Kingdom’s internal discourse,”15 so while not 
perfect, the descriptions Wahhabi and Wahhabism appear to be the best and most 
convenient terms to use.  
This study will begin with an in-depth assessment of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
interpretation of Islam, examining his views on some of the most important aspects 
of Islamic theology and practice. I will evaluate how his ideas compare to other 
Islamic scholars, and how his works fit within the wider Islamic milieu. In Chapter 2 
the relationship between Wahhabi Islam and the Saudi state is explored, and 
                                                          
9
 Dumitriu (2004) ‘The E.U.’s Definition of Terrorism’, in German Law Journal, p.590 
10
 Zarabozo (2010) The Life, Teachings and Influence of Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab p.157 
11
 Abualrub, op. cit., p.184 
12
 Algar (2002) Wahhabism: A Critical Essay p.1  
13
 Zarabozo, op. cit., p.158 
14
 al-Uthaymin (2009) Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab: The Man and His Works p.xiv 
15
 International Crisis Group (2004) ‘Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?’, in Middle East Report, p.3n 
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important episodes in this history are discussed. The dissertation goes on to assess 
what happens when Wahhabi ideology is exported beyond the borders of Saudi 
Arabia, focusing in particular on the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan which was to 
play a significant part in the development of global terrorism in later years. Chapters 
4 and 5 will compare Wahhabi ideology to that of some of the most prominent 
terrorist groups, including analysing whether it is part of the philosophy of Osama 
bin Laden and al-Qaeda, as has often been suggested. A discussion of the present-
day status of Islam in Saudi Arabia will follow, and I will look at how domestic 
terrorism and accusations of radicalism have affected the role of the Wahhabi ulema. 
I will conclude by summing up some of the most pressing questions regarding global 
terrorism, and consider whether Wahhabi Islam has played a part in its rise. 
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2. Literature Review 
The fierce debate about Wahhabi Islam is often characterised by polarised and 
sometimes polemical views. Authors such as Sardar and Oliveti blame Wahhabi 
Islam for intolerance and even violence, while some, for example Lacey, believe that 
elements of Saudi society as a whole are in fact responsible for rigid and intolerant 
attitudes. Others, Commins and DeLong-Bas in particular, find few reasons for 
concern in Wahhabi ideology, believing instead that it can be a constructive and 
positive force in society. 
Oliveti’s book Terror’s Source: The Ideology of Wahhabi-Salafism and its 
Consequences, aims to show how this form of Islam is liable for turning some 
Muslims to terrorism, yet I believe that he has understood much of Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s teachings incorrectly. Oliveti states that Wahhabis diminish the role of the 
Prophet and reject traditional authority
16
, but their main focus is on returning Islam 
to the purity of the time of Muhammad, and the Sunnah and hadith are upheld as the 
primary sources of Islamic authority, along with the Quran. Similarly, Oliveti writes 
that Wahhabis do not respect rulers
17
, but Ibn Abd al-Wahhab taught loyalty to a 
leader in all cases, unless he should violate the tenets of Islam. What emerges from 
Oliveti’s work is a very confused picture of what he understands Wahhabi Islam to 
be: on the one hand he asserts that the first step in preventing terrorism is to stop the 
spread of salafi forms of Islam, yet he also writes that Wahhabism “...does not, in its 
current form believe in, allow or encourage terrorism or the slaughter of innocent 
civilians. On the contrary, it bans these things strictly.”18 This confusion seems to be 
typical in discussions of Wahhabi Islam, and is one of the main reasons why it is so 
important to study Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings more closely. 
Sardar is also deeply critical of Wahhabi Islam, since he believes that in its current 
form “[t]he history and culture of Muslim civilization, in all its greatness, 
complexity and plurality, is totally irrelevant; indeed, it is rejected as deviancy and 
degeneration”, in favour of a constructed notion of Islam during the days of the 
Prophet
19. Similarly, “...Wahhabism has stripped Islam of all its ethical and moral 
                                                          
16
 Oliveti (2002) Terror’s Source: The Ideology of Wahhabi-Salafism and its Consequences pp.33;43 
17
 Ibid., p.34 
18
 Ibid., pp.77;43 
19
 Sardar (2004) Desperately Seeking Paradise p.145 
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content and reduced it to an arid list of dos and don’ts. To insist that anything that 
cannot be found in a literal reading of the sources and lore of early Muslims is kufr – 
outside the domain of Islam – and to enforce this comprehensive vision with brute 
force and severe social pressure for complete conformity spells totalitarianism.”20 
Sardar writes that modern Wahhabi Islam owes as much to Ibn Taymiyya as it does 
to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and as such it is the basis for Islamism
21
. However, Islamism 
does not amount to terrorism, and many Islamists want to achieve their goals through 
peaceful means, for example as part of a state’s existing political process. The 
assumption that if Wahhabism has influenced Islamism it is de facto responsible for 
political radicalism or even terrorism is a worrying trait of some studies. 
Lacey feels that rather than Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings, it is the peculiarities of 
Saudi Arabia itself that lead to the development of extremist attitudes: “If you 
subject a society to all those pressures – the rigid religion, the tribe, the law, the 
traditions, the family, the police and, above all, the oppressive political system in 
which you can’t express yourself... And then if you present them with the doctrine of 
takfeer, the idea that all their problems come from outside themselves, and that you 
should try to destroy people who do not share your own particular view of God, then 
you are going to end up with some folks who are very dangerous indeed.”22 Yet 
Hegghammer points out that the tendency in the existing literature to assume that a 
combination of Saudi society and Wahhabi Islam turns people to terrorism does not 
explain why such a small minority of Saudi citizens have gone on to carry out 
terrorist actions
23
. 
Like Hegghammer, Commins questions whether Wahhabism can be blamed for the 
violent actions of a few Muslims. While stating that Saudi-funded publications, 
schools and mosques can be religiously intolerant and even xenophobic
24
, he thinks 
that 9/11 and the legacy of Osama bin Laden are responsible for creating the 
impression that Wahhabi Islam foments terrorism
25. Commins’ work reflects the 
                                                          
20
 Ibid., p.149 
21
 Ibid., pp.145;151. Knudsen suggests that most Islamist groups espouse a Wahhabi ideology – see 
Knudsen (2005) ‘Islamism in the Diaspora’, in Journal of Refugee Studies, p.226 
22
 Lacey (2009) Inside the Kingdom p.226-7 
23
 Hegghammer (2006) ‘Militant Islamism in Saudi Arabia: Patterns of Recruitment to “Al-Qaida on 
the Arabian Peninsula”’, from Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terror 
Networks, p.22 
24
 Commins (2009) The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia pp.192;184 
25
 Ibid., p.190  
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views of Abualrub, Zarabozo and al-Uthaymin, who also consider Wahhabi Islam to 
be primarily about calling Muslims to the correct beliefs and practices
26
.  
Alongside these studies stands Wahhabi Islam by DeLong-Bas. Her book attempts to 
“present for the first time in a Western language the themes of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
writings that are of greatest concern post-9/11: Wahhabi theology and worldview, 
Islamic law, women and gender, and jihad.”27 Of particular importance is her 
analysis of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s views on jihad. Comparing them to the thoughts of 
other Islamic scholars and those of modern militants, DeLong-Bas finds that “...the 
reality is that violence is largely and notably absent. Although there are some calls 
for fighting those who are labelled kuffar, the use of this term is much more limited 
than has traditionally been assumed.”28 Also, “if militant extremism is inherent to 
Wahhabism, then this theme should dominate the writings of its founder and 
ideologue,” yet “...Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never called for wholesale killing of people, 
not even apostates.”29 DeLong-Bas directly questions the dominant perceptions 
about Wahhabi Islam and there is a lot of useful information and analysis in her 
work, but it is important to note that her work was produced with financial support 
from the King Abd al-Aziz Foundation for Research and Archives, and therefore 
may not be as impartial a study as would be the ideal.  
What is clear from a brief summary of the available literature is that views on 
Wahhabi Islam tend to be polarised, and there is a great deal of contradiction among 
them. While some have found aspects of Wahhabi Islam troubling, many scholars 
take the stance of apologists and find that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s dawa, although 
strict, was simply a continuation of Islam in the Hanbali strain. I hope my research 
will go some way to bridging the gaps in the current scholarship, by examining 
Wahhabi Islam with specific reference to radicalisation and terrorism, but without 
the antagonistic stance which has dominated so many other studies.  
  
                                                          
26
 Ibid., p.190. See Abualrub, op. cit.: Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was a da’iyah (a teacher or caller), p.600; 
he was continuing the dawa of the early generations of Islam, p.681. Also Zarabozo, op. cit.: Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab saw dawa as the noblest activity, p.111 and al-Uthaymin, op. cit.: Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
call to Islam led to greater security and unity in the communities of Central Arabia, pp.144;151 
27
 DeLong-Bas (2004) Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, p.5 
28
 Ibid., p.221 
29
 Ibid., pp.194; 82 [original emphasis] 
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3. Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab: His Theology and Works  
In order to understand the nuances of Wahhabi Islam’s ideology and practice, one 
must briefly examine the context in which Ibn Abd al-Wahhab formulated his dawa. 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703CE (1115AH), in Uyayna, Najd, 
to a Hanbali family. Society in the Najd in the eighteenth century was tribal, and 
Islam was practiced alongside other more ritualistic forms of religious tradition. 
Consequently, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab considered that even in Arabia, the very heartland 
of Islam, the religion was being corrupted by un-Islamic ideas and practices and was 
therefore impure. This led to his focus on a return to a pure Islam, which was 
unpolluted by innovations and polytheistic customs. Similar ideas would later be 
developed by thinkers including Muhammad Abduh, and would pave the way for the 
development of the salafiyya movement
30
. 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab laid down a whole corpus of teachings from which Wahhabis 
draw their religious, social and political positions. The most important of Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s works is Kitab al-Tawhid (The Book of Monotheism), which al-Uthaymin 
calls a “manifesto of Wahhabi doctrines”31. Backing his arguments up with Quranic 
verses, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab demonstrates to his followers how many of the practices 
which they considered to be commonplace are in fact inconsistent with pure Islam
32
. 
The book emphasises tawhid and condemns shirk in all its forms
33
, and like most of 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s works it is dedicated to correcting the beliefs and practices of 
Muslims, since aqidah (Islamic theology) was Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s focus34. 
Similarly important is al-Usul al-Thalatha (Three Principles), where Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab notes that the three most important aspects of a Muslim’s life are to know 
about God, to work according to that knowledge and to pass one’s awareness on to 
others through preaching
35
. So the key concepts for Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were tawhid 
and the avoidance of shirk, and he believed it his duty to educate other Muslims 
through his dawa. 
                                                          
30
 The salafiyya movement emphasises the role of the salaf (the pious ancestors of Islam) as a model 
of Islamic behaviour. 
31
 al-Uthaymin, op. cit., p.77 
32
 Ibid., p.77 
33
 Abualrub, op. cit., p.75 
34
 Zarabozo, op. cit., pp.148; 143 
35
 al-Uthaymin, op. cit., p.84 
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As a Hanbali, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine of tawhid was exacting, and it became 
the cornerstone of his teachings, leading to the designation al-Muwahhidun for his 
followers. Al-Uthaymin notes that the upholding of tawhid directs Wahhabis to three 
possible actions: the denunciation as infidels those who understand yet reject tawhid; 
the denunciation of those who practice or extol polytheism because of the influence 
or actions of the majority in a community; and the sanctioning of warfare against 
these two groups in order that Islam remains unadulterated
36
. In other words, Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab’s strict teachings on tawhid could be used to endorse attacks on 
unbelievers, hypocrites (those whose actions are un-Islamic despite their claims to be 
Muslim), and polytheists
37
, in order to defend the purity of Islam. However, 
DeLong-Bas does not believe that Kitab al-Tawhid was a manifesto justifying 
physical fighting against those with different beliefs, since she feels that in the 
broader context of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s written works it was intended to edify the 
ummah (Islamic community), not vilify others
38
. 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab believed that shirk was the biggest possible sin and he made a 
clear distinction between greater and lesser shirk
39
, with lesser shirk being hypocrisy 
or personal glorification, and greater shirk being when another being than God is 
called upon
40
. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s view of shirk was rigidly inflexible, and as such 
he has often been criticised for condemning other Muslims who did not adhere to his 
interpretation of Islam. Coulson writes that this intolerant interpretation of the notion 
of shirk can be used as the central justification for violent jihad on a global scale
41
, 
but Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings focused on correcting the beliefs and practices of 
other Muslims, not attacking non-believers. In particular, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab has 
often been accused of strongly censuring Sufism, most notably for its saint worship, 
because the existence of shrines challenged Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s ideas about 
tawhid. However, DeLong-Bas finds that Sufis are rarely mentioned in Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s works, since he did not target them specifically, but rather targeted 
practices which he considered errant
42
. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s desire to eradicate all 
                                                          
36
 Ibid., p.114 
37
 Hiro (1988) Islamic Fundamentalism p.109 
38
 DeLong-Bas, op. cit., p.57 
39
 Zarabozo, op. cit., pp.355; 241 
40
 DeLong-Bas, op. cit., pp.63-4 
41
 Coulson (2004) ‘Education and Indoctrination in the Muslim World’, in Policy Analysis, p.8 
42
 DeLong-Bas, op. cit., p.84 
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shirk even extended to opposition to the worship being carried out at Muhammad’s 
tomb, since he believed that it was putting the Prophet on a level with God
43
.  
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab also strongly criticised any bida (innovations to Islam that 
appear as contrary to the Quran and Sunnah) as they have the potential to threaten 
the Islamic community by challenging tawhid
44
, and because the Prophet rejected 
any embellishments to or deletions from Islam
45
. This notion is characteristic of the 
Hanbali madhhab, but is also an established ruling in the other schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence
46
. However, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab attacked the other orthodox 
madhhabs for what he viewed as compromise with Sufi bida
47
, including the 
building of minarets on mosques, and the use of the subha (prayer beads)
48
. As Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab took the Quran and Sunnah as the only legitimate sources of Islamic 
law, thus the normative form of Islam, innovations could never become normative 
for him and would remain merely ‘popular’49. His grandson Abdullah wrote, “as 
regards Bid’at, our doctrine is that Bid’at is whatever has been introduced after the 
third generation from Muhammad is absolutely sinful”50. Yet bida, although against 
sharia, did not cause Ibn Abd al-Wahhab to view a Muslim as an unbeliever
51
. 
Kepel, deeply critical of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s call, has written that independent 
thinking and reasoning along the lines of ijtihad, is not allowed in Wahhabi doctrine, 
and solutions should be sought via the literal implementation of the sacred texts and 
the tradition of the Prophet
52
 (taqlid of the Prophet). However, this view is in sharp 
contrast to the actual teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, which preferred ijtihad over 
taqlid (blind imitation), for any area where the Quran and Sunnah were unclear. 
Denny says that while Ibn Abd al-Wahhab preached a return to ijtihad, what he 
rejected was rational speculation
53
, as this has no basis in the Quran and Sunnah. For 
the most part, Islamic reformers emphasise the believer’s right to practice ijtihad, 
and here Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was no different, since he viewed a renewal of personal 
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faith as necessary in order for Islam as a whole to be renewed and revitalised. Since 
the hadith were considered preferable to the intrinsic weakness of human 
reasoning
54
, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab called for a return to the Quran and Sunna, and 
secondly to the ijma (consensus) of the time of the Prophet’s companions55, before 
accretions to Islam altered it.  
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab considered sharia to be the ultimate form of law, which should 
be employed exclusively in place of any other system of law, whether secular or 
tribal in nature. Lambton writes that sharia has absolute authority, since it preceded 
the state and was its law
56
; thus, any departure from sharia is to be regarded as 
innovation and consequently un-Islamic
57
. The implementation of sharia also suited 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab because it could act as a means of social control within a society 
which was tribal and fractured. Following the Hanbali example, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
was conservative in his interpretation of sharia, but was in favour of a methodology 
that considered everything not explicitly forbidden in the Quran and Sunnah to be 
permissible
58
. 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 1744 relocation from Uyayna to Diriya was referred to by his 
followers as Al-Hijra (migration), because it was viewed in the same light as the 
Prophet’s journey from Mecca to Medina59; both men were forced to flee persecution 
for their beliefs and resettle elsewhere. Although hijra was not prominent in Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab’s writings, he considered it a duty for Muslims who were unable to 
practice their religion
60
, and preferable to fighting others
61
. For converts to Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab’s form of Islam, the ‘hijra’ was both physical and spiritual: tribal law 
was replaced with adherence to sharia, and social bonds formed in one’s previous 
way of life were replaced with membership in his Islamic Brotherhood (Ikhwan)
62
.  
Many scholars have considered takfir (calling a Muslim an unbeliever), to be a core 
component of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine and practices. For example, Hiro and 
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Algar both believe that any Muslim who did not follow Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
interpretation of Islam was regarded as an apostate
63
, and Hodgson goes so far as to 
say that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab denounced other Muslims as infidels to be killed
64
. 
Kepel writes that takfir was exercised zealously in the period following the 1744-45 
alliance between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Saud
65, and Fattah that “...the 
conviction that even ‘orthodox’ Muslims could be considered unbelievers in the 
context of the ‘true’ faith may have legitimized the notion that violence was a 
necessary tool in the pursuit of Islamic re-education.”66 This association of Wahhabi 
Islam with takfir is problematic because takfir can unquestionably lead to violence, 
and therefore Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings have been linked with violence and 
intolerance towards other Muslims. However, Abualrub says that Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab refuted the notion that any Muslim who was not a Wahhabi was 
automatically considered kuffar
67
 (unbeliever). Whilst Ibn Abd al-Wahhab said that 
not everybody making the testimony of faith was a true Muslim, he was careful to 
distinguish between greater and lesser kufr
68
 (unbelief). According to Zarabozo, Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab would not declare anybody an unbeliever until they fully understood 
and yet continued to reject tawhid, preferring to continue with a life of shirk and 
kufr
69. Abdullah wrote, “we brand as Kafirs only those who having heard our call to 
the true faith, are deaf to it, and who having heard the proofs in its favour, 
obstinately reject it”70. Zarabozo also states that for Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, unlike for 
the Khawarij and other extremist groups, committing a sin does not automatically 
make a person an apostate
71
. So Zarabozo demonstrates that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did 
not employ takfir freely, and for Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, dawa meant changing society 
‘with the hand’; he aimed to do this through preaching and books, financial aid, 
mosque building and missionary activity
72
. 
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Ibn Abd al-Wahhab set down three conditions for launching jihad, which must all be 
preceded by an attempt to call the opponents to Islam
73
. These were: when a Muslim 
force meets an enemy force, when an enemy force approaches Muslim territory, or 
when the legitimate Islamic leader deems it necessary
74
. Jihad is therefore always a 
defensive military action, and always against adult male combatants, since Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab rejected the killing of non-combatants, women and children
75
. Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab viewed jihad as a collective duty, and backed up his ideas on the subject 
with Quranic verses such as 8:61, which says that if an opponent inclines to peace, 
one should incline to peace also
76
. As such, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab fits within Rudolph 
Peters’ classification of a modernist jihad writer77, since he emphasised the defensive 
qualities of jihad. Significantly, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab rejected jihad against people 
whose practices were simply not in keeping with his interpretation of Islam, and 
although Kitab al-Tawhid repeatedly condemns these people, it does not call for any 
form of violence against them
78
. This is important because Wahhabis have frequently 
been accused of attacking other Muslims, but clearly Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not 
sanction this kind of behaviour. Indeed, DeLong-Bas finds that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
emphasised dawa over jihad because the purpose of his mission was to change 
peoples’ practices:  
Someone who does not adhere to or believe in tawhid is necessarily 
categorized as a non-Muslim and is excluded from the Muslim 
community (ummah). It is important to note that exclusion from the 
ummah did not mean that such a person was necessarily and 
immediately subject to jihad as holy war. Rather, it opened the door 
to proselytization and pointed to the need to educate such a person. 
Jihad as holy war became a possibility in certain clearly defined 
circumstances, but it was neither a requirement nor a foregone 
conclusion.
79
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Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s dawa did not, therefore, differ significantly from other Hanbali 
thinkers; it did not represent a break with orthodox thought in Islam, or a new 
madhhab in itself. He emphasised the importance of the Quran and hadith, and 
permitted ijtihad for any area which was not explicit in the texts. He also, like other 
Hanbalis, accepted rulings from the other recognised madhhabs where his own was 
unclear
80
. Consistent with the Hanbali school of thought, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not 
tolerate innovations or lapses in practice among Muslims, and when he censured 
other Muslims for what he viewed as corruption in Islam, he was following in the 
footsteps of other Hanbali scholars. It is understandable that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
ideas were criticised by those outside the Hanbali school, since each madhhab differs 
in their interpretations of the Quran and hadith and in the emphasis that is placed 
upon the various aspects of Islam. What can make Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
interpretation of Islam appear as different from other forms or even radical, is merely 
the prominence he placed on certain ideas and practices over others, most notably in 
his exacting doctrine of tawhid. 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is often condemned as taking his ideology directly from Ibn 
Taymiyya, an Islamic scholar frequently criticised for having an intolerant approach 
which inspires violence and sectarianism. Ibn Taymiyya has been regarded as the 
key reference for the Sunni Islamist movement, as his works were cited to justify 
actions such as the assassination of Sadat in 1981, and even to censure the Saudi 
Arabian government and to call for it to be deposed in the mid-1990s
81
. One of the 
core principles of Islamism is loyalty to the salaf, something emphasised by the 
teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya but also by most Islamic 
revivalists throughout history. Kepel frequently refers to the similarities between the 
ideas of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
82
; both men were Hanbali reformers 
who called for the renewal of Islam and the elimination of un-Islamic accretions, 
even when these innovations had gained the consensus of jurisprudents, and Ibn 
Taymiyya’s doctrine also opposed the cult of saints, shirk and the taqlid of jurists. 
Like Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn Taymiyya taught obedience to a ruler unless they 
violated sharia
83
, but unlike Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn Taymiyya had quite extreme 
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views on jihad as armed struggle, and strongly praised martyrdom, something which 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never discussed
84
. DeLong-Bas demonstrates how in Kitab al-
Tawhid, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab referred to many other sources, and only cited Ibn 
Taymiyya three times out of a total of 170 references
85
. 
However, when Wahhabism moved beyond the boundaries of Najd and into the 
wider Muslim world in the nineteenth century, the conscious citation of Ibn 
Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim by Wahhabi ulema increased
86
. These new ideas were 
incorporated into Wahhabi doctrine at a time when Wahhabism found itself 
threatened by the Ottoman sultan: “Ibn Taymiyya provided a worldview and 
ideology that allowed for revolution against an unfaithful ruler by denying him his 
status as a Muslim on the basis of his failure to fulfil his responsibilities to Islam”87. 
This fusion of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s and Ibn Taymiyya’s writings is not present in 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s original texts, and the aims of his dawa were very different to 
Ibn Taymiyya’s. Although Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself adopted a little of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s thinking, he was influenced more by Ibn Hanbal88, so much so in fact, 
that Wahhabis can be viewed as ‘neo-Hanbalis’89. Yet DeLong-Bas finds this notion 
problematic, since she feels that Ibn Taymiyya’s membership of the Hanbali 
madhhab has coloured the entire school with a supposed propensity for intolerance 
which consequently affects views of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a Hanbali
90
. Although 
Ibn Taymiyya espoused a fundamentalist attitude, his views did not dominate the 
Hanbali madhhab during Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s lifetime, so Ibn Taymiyya was only a 
small part of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s inspiration91.  
Gätje considers Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his followers to be the first Islamic 
reformers with a theological leaning
92
. In particular, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s criticism 
of the corruption of Islam by bida and shirk was to be a key component of almost all 
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subsequent reform movements in Islam. Indeed, in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, Wahhabism was the sole expression of the desire to return to the pure 
monotheism of early Islam
93
, and even to the present day this is a tendency which 
can be seen in many Islamic movements. Gibb says it was the first assertion of the 
‘Arab idea’94, which was later followed by many Islamic thinkers. The apparent 
inflexibility of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s ideas can perhaps be attributed to the social and 
geographical conditions of Arabia during his lifetime, as Islam in the Najd did not 
have to contend with any other form of well-established religion
95
. This changed 
with the infiltration of secular and modernist political, religious and social concepts 
from the end of the eighteenth century. One major result of this was the development 
of the revivalist salafiyya school of thought in the late nineteenth century. Calling for 
a return to the Islam of the salaf, key thinkers of the salafiyya have included 
Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Elias notes how Rida, an adherent of the 
Hanbali school, supported some of the ideas of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
96
. The main 
points of correlation between the two are their anti-Sufi stance, and the notion that 
the principles on which Islam is founded are fixed: “In defending the unchanging 
doctrines of Islam against all attacks [Rida] was to draw closer to the Hanbali 
interpretation of it, and later to Wahhabism...”97 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s ideas and practices were shaped by the prevailing political and 
socio-economic conditions of the Najd in his lifetime. His ideology represented an 
internal challenge within Islam
98
 because it aimed to change the way in which 
Muslims thought about and practiced their religion. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab succeeded in 
replacing tribal affiliations with loyalty to his interpretation of Islam, and so unified 
many Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula. Society came to be organised around Islam, 
and as such Ibn Abd al-Wahhab can be seen to have developed an ummah, with his 
doctrine as the core of that community’s existence. His interpretation of Islam was in 
line with that of the Hanbali madhhab, and represented a continuation of this school 
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of thought, not a break with orthodox Islam. His use of takfir and jihad were far 
more limited than has been often assumed, and were restricted to very specific 
conditions; this is not something one would expect to find if his ideas have in fact 
been influential on global terrorism. In his search for a return to a pure, uncorrupted 
Islam, and his emphasis on tawhid, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab paved the way for reformers 
in later centuries, particularly those of the salafiyya movement. 
  
24 
 
4. Wahhabi Islam and the Saudi State 
During Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s lifetime, he controlled the alliance that he had made 
with the al-Saud family, as the secular, military forces of the family were reliant on 
the religious unity that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab provided. When Ibn Abd al-Wahhab died 
in 1792CE, the al-Saud’s began to dominate the union, and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
followers were used to legitimate their grip on authority. In this way, Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s religious ideology was transformed into a political tool. In 1913, Abdul 
Aziz began to set up colonies of ikhwan, referred to as hijar (migrant communities, 
from the plural of hijra), which became the religious, political, educational, 
administrative and military centres for Wahhabism
99
. Authority in the hijar was 
hierarchical and mosque-centred, with the ulema playing a central role in everyday 
life. Religious police (mutawwin), trained in Riyadh, also played a prominent part in 
imparting Wahhabi doctrine to the colony members; those not performing the 
prescribed Islamic rituals, and those caught smoking, dancing or singing, or wearing 
gold or silk were punished by the mutawwin
100
. The duty to command right and 
forbid wrong, as represented by the religious police, was not a central focus of Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab’s writings, but became prominent in the early twentieth century101. 
By 1920, there were 200 ikhwan settlements, each with a population of around 2000, 
and they provided the vast majority of the personnel for Abdul Aziz’s army102. His 
fervour for territory was combined with a pragmatic appreciation of the way in 
which Wahhabism could help him establish a state in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Every military campaign Abdul Aziz instigated was expressed in Islamic terms, as a 
jihad to punish apostates and dissenters
103
. This was in stark contrast to the military 
activities of Muhammad Ibn Saud in the mid-eighteenth century, when despite their 
mutually beneficial relationship, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab refused to legitimate all of Ibn 
Saud’s campaigns as jihad, believing instead that dawa should be used before 
military force
104
. Abdul Aziz was successful in expanding his territory, and hence the 
territory which was dominated by Wahhabi Islam, but by 1929, the ikhwan had 
surpassed Abdul Aziz’s ability to control them, and after defeating them militarily, 
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the hijar lost both political sway and cultural importance. Although the ikhwan 
represented a revival of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s reformism, their beliefs and practices 
took a significant departure from his teachings. Commins notes how it is unclear 
where the ikhwan took their inspiration from, since their doctrine of separation was 
so extreme that even other Wahhabis were condemned by them
105
. The ikhwan 
colonies represent one period of modern-day Saudi Arabia’s, and consequently 
Wahhabi Islam’s, history, but they were not exact replicas of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
interpretation of Islam or of social organisation in the Arabian Peninsula during his 
lifetime; rather, they represent the employment of aspects of his ideology by a 
secular force, for the purpose of state-building and social control. Despite the support 
they gave to Abdul Aziz during the last stages of the ikhwan, after the collapse of the 
hijar system the Wahhabi ulema were consigned to the supervision of morality and 
positions within education
106
. This change in their role and status was to have a 
significant impact upon the situation in the kingdom in later decades. 
In 1952, Nasser came to power in Egypt, and put in place a socialist regime in the 
country. His measures of repression, imprisonment, and the attribution of an 
assassination attempt to the Muslim Brotherhood forced a significant number of its 
members to flee Egypt. Many of these pious and educated Muslims sought refuge in 
Saudi Arabia and the influx of Egyptians continued throughout the 1950s. 
Immigration peaked around the time of Sayyid Qutb’s execution in 1966, and was 
bolstered by Syrians and Iraqis fleeing the nationalist, Baathist regimes of their home 
countries too. The Saudi government viewed their arrival with favour, giving them 
leading positions inside the kingdom on the understanding that they were not 
allowed to preach their religious or political doctrines
107
. For the Saudi state, the 
Muslim Brotherhood could be used to fill the vacuum between the Saudi monarchy’s 
practical plans for development, and the intellectually stagnant Wahhabi ulema
108
, 
which resisted attempts at modernisation: 
In the melting pot of Arabia during the 1960s, local clerics trained in 
the Wahhabite tradition joined with activists and militants affiliated 
with the Muslim Brothers who had been exiled from the neighbouring 
countries of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq... This blend of traditionalists and 
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modern Islamist militants served the kingdom’s interests well at 
first... But eventually this volatile mixture would explode in the 
Saudis’ hands109. 
Some of these Egyptian migrants were heavily influenced by the radical Muslim 
Brotherhood ideologue, Sayyid Qutb. Qutb emphasised the need to change society 
through political action, of which a part included physical jihad. Qutb argued that 
revolution was acceptable in Egypt because the country’s rulers were not true 
Muslims
110
. For Qutb, it was not just the Egyptian government which were un-
Islamic, for he viewed Egyptian society as a whole as being in a state of jahiliyya 
(ignorance, particularly with regards to Islam), and by the end of his life he had 
come to view the entire world, including Muslim societies, as jahiliyya, since he felt 
that no true Islamic community existed anymore
111
. While Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
taught a doctrine of hijra in so far as he felt Muslims should not associate closely 
with non-Muslims or Muslims who shared different practices, for Qutb hijra was a 
literal physical withdrawal from society which enabled a person to prepare for their 
struggle for Islam. Related to the concept of jahiliyya are ideas about takfir and 
istihlal (considering that which is religiously forbidden to be acceptable): terrorism 
has been justified by some with the assertion that when society is in a state of 
jahiliyya, behaviour that is haram (religiously forbidden) can become halal 
(religiously permitted)
112
, and thus acts of terrorism can be validated as a means of 
defending or establishing a true Islamic society. Another notion which Qutb 
emphasised was the idea that sovereignty belongs to God alone, and this view is 
cited by many contemporary terrorists when justifying attacks on governing 
structures in Muslim states. So Qutb’s doctrine provides an explicit manifesto for 
revolutionary and even violent action. His thinking is a clear influence on many of 
today’s global terrorists, and also influenced a number of Saudi youth when it was 
transmitted in Saudi Arabia’s colleges by Muslim Brothers including Sayyid’s 
brother Muhammad Qutb. This was to have a significant impact in later decades, 
when Saudi Arabia was the subject of calls for revolution, and even terrorist activity 
by its own citizens. 
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In 1962, the Muslim World League (MWL) was established in Mecca, and Kepel 
says that “...this was the first coherent and systematic institution whose avowed 
interest was to “Wahhabize” Islam worldwide”, through the distribution of the works 
of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya, missionary activity, and fundraising for 
building mosques and the subsidisation of Islamic associations
113
. Whilst it was no 
doubt hoped that the economic aid and social support the MWL provided would 
effectively translate into an ideological preference for Saudi Wahhabism among its 
recipients, there is no evidence to suggest that the MWL actively sought to exclude 
all other forms of Islam. The finance for its projects came largely from private 
donors and the royal family within Saudi Arabia
114
, and the League is managed by 
ulema from the Saudi religious establishment. By the late 1970s, the League had 
begun to open offices in Europe, primarily focused on working with local Muslim 
associations to build mosques
115
. Commins notes that the World Assembly of 
Muslim Youth, also led by Saudi Arabia, is essentially the same kind of organisation 
as the MWL, but says that its reading lists include far more of Sayyid Qutb’s works 
than Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s116; if true, then this is potentially worrying in terms of the 
radicalising influence that these texts may have over young Muslims throughout the 
world. 
The other Saudi-dominated organisation which is of importance is the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC), created in 1969. Kepel notes how the installation of 
a general secretariat in Jeddah demonstrated the strong Saudi commitment to the 
OIC, an organisation whose charter promotes Islamic solidarity and aims to protect 
the Holy Places
117
. Initiatives implemented by the OIC include the pioneering 
Islamic Development Bank, which became operational in 1975 and was based in 
Jeddah. This finances development projects in the poorest Muslim countries, and the 
Islamic banking network which ensued enabled Saudi Arabia to gain support from 
the middle classes in much of the Muslim world. After the boom in oil prices in 
1973, Saudi Arabia experienced a vast increase in its political power internationally; 
oil-producing states were now not only able to dominate the discourse between 
Muslim countries, but also had a commanding voice on the world stage. For Saudi 
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Arabia, this meant increased opportunities to promote Wahhabism throughout the 
world.  
In 1984, the King Fahd Holy Koran Printing Complex was opened, and millions of 
Qurans and Wahhabi texts have since been distributed throughout the world by the 
Saudi Ministry for Religious Affairs
118
. Eickelman and Piscatori estimate the number 
of Qurans printed in Saudi Arabia to be around 9.5 million a year, of which 3 million 
are not in Arabic; between 1980 and 1992, more than 50 million Qurans were sent 
outside the kingdom, and 5 million more were given to pilgrims during the hajj
119
. 
This meant that for the very first time in Islam’s history, books, pamphlets and tapes 
with an identical doctrine could be found throughout the ummah, and so all forms of 
Islam except Wahhabism were excluded
120
; this could potentially result in a decrease 
in pluralism within Islam. Saudi funding has also built more than 1500 mosques 
across the globe
121
, but according to Burke, 
“The Saudis provide hard-line clerics... In Pakistan, money from the 
Persian Gulf has funded the massive expansion of madrasas (Islamic 
schools) that indoctrinate young students with virulent, anti-Western 
dogma. This Saudi-funded proselytism has enormously damaged 
long-standing tolerant and pluralist traditions of Islamic observance in 
East and West Africa, the Far East and Central Asia... And many of 
the mosques known for radical activity in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada were built with donations from private and 
state sources in Saudi Arabia.”122 
Some people feel that through this distribution of capital, “the Saudi government is 
actively abetting the radicalization of Islamic education”123. Yet if what is being 
taught follows the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, there should be little reason for 
concern if the analyses of Commins, Abualrub and DeLong-Bas are to be believed. 
However, it is more likely that aspects of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s dawa have been 
combined with the radical ideas of Qutb and several modern jihadist thinkers, as 
these would provide the anti-Western doctrine which researchers such as Burke find 
to be prevalent in Saudi-funded institutions.  
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Alongside the newly settled migrants, the vast increase in oil wealth during the 
1970s quickly brought change to the Arabian Peninsula. Growing outside influence, 
particularly from Western nations, and a society which was becoming increasingly 
fractured internally, led the Saudi monarchy to implement a gradual process of 
change with regards to state institutions, economics and religion. For example, in 
1970, the Office of Grand Mufti was replaced with a Ministry of Justice. This meant 
that instead of being an independent religious authority, the head of the sharia courts 
was now subordinated beneath the political authority of the King
124
. The era of King 
Faisal (r. 1964-1975CE) also saw attempts at reform in education, with programmes 
for the mass education of girls as well as boys being introduced. Religious 
institutions such as the Islamic University at Medina were able to attract many non-
Saudi students because they represented a religious alternative to the secular higher 
education institutes which were dominating the rest of the Arab world
125
. These 
religious universities offered funding which made them attractive to lower class 
students, but in many cases they served to widen the cultural and economic divide 
between the devoutly religious and comparatively secular aspects of Saudi society, 
since job prospects for graduates from these institutions were poor
126
. Those sectors 
of society dissatisfied with the monarchy subsequently grew, as did the popularity of 
dissident religious trends which were opposed to the al-Sauds. Forcible relaxation of 
the ulema’s grip on their traditional areas of supervision changed their standing in 
society, and ultimately led to dissent among those clerics unhappy with this 
reduction in their power. So it was not just some Saudi-educated youth who became 
radicalised, but some of the establishment ulema too.  
One radical influence on the Saudi ulema was Muhammad Surur, a Syrian Muslim 
Brother, who settled in Burayda, Saudi Arabia in 1965. Here he taught at a religious 
institute where he extended his influence over different generations of Saudis
127
, 
including Salman al-Awda, who was to become a leading member of the ulema
128
. 
Surur’s salafist ideology was consistent with the Muslim Brotherhood’s, in that his 
ultimate goal was to seize political power in order to enforce sharia via the authority 
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of the state
129
. However, his methods for achieving this aim became gradually more 
extreme. Although opposed to a violent revolutionary struggle, Surur’s preaching 
threatened the stability of Saudi Arabia because it combined Muslim Brotherhood 
activism and some of the revolutionary thinking of Sayyid Qutb with Wahhabi 
theology
130
. In 1973 he was asked to leave the country, largely because his writings 
were denigrating the Wahhabi ulema for the concessions they were making to the 
monarchy
131
. Although Surur was a critic of the jihadist trend which arose in the 
1980s, his blend of Qutbist aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood’s thought with 
official Wahhabism went on to influence the sahwa (awakening)
132
, a revival of 
Islam in Saudi Arabia which began after the Grand Mosque seizure of 1979. 
On November 20
th
, 1979, the Grand Mosque in Mecca, al-Masjid al-Haram, was 
seized by a group of militants who wished to overthrow the Saudi monarchy and end 
Saudi allegiance to Western powers. Their leader was Juhayman ibn Saif al-Utaybi, a 
former member of the National Guard, where military discipline, strong anti-Western 
rhetoric and fierce piety prevailed
133
. He also studied under Ibn Baz, a leading 
ideologue of establishment Islam, at the Islamic University of Medina
134
. Al-Utaybi 
took Ibn Baz’s instructions to return to the pure teachings of the Quran and hadith, 
and combined this traditional Wahhabi concept with a non-Wahhabi, physical hijra 
to Qasim, where he set up a network of cells into which he imparted a militant piety 
in his disciples
135
. In 1976, he moved to Riyadh where he published a pamphlet 
entitled ‘Rules of Allegiance and Obedience: the Misconduct of Rulers’, in which he 
lambasted the Saudi monarchy for wrongs including corruption and greed, deviation 
from the sharia, and association with unbelievers
136
. Al-Utaybi also explored and 
developed the concept of the mahdi
137
, thus creating a hybrid ideology with the 
capacity for revolution. Kepel calls this doctrine “ultra-Wahhabi” or “extreme 
Wahhabis”138, showing that it is not part of orthodox Wahhabi Islam. 
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The Mosque seizure lasted two weeks, during which time hundreds of pilgrims 
making the hajj were taken as hostages, and at least 200 people were killed. It 
significantly affected Saudi Arabia’s standing in the Muslim world, not just because 
it occurred at Islam’s holiest site, but because Saudi Arabia had to call for outside 
help to end the siege. More worrying still for the Saudi leadership was that the 
militants came mainly from Najd, the traditional power base of the monarchy and 
Wahhabi Islam. A large number of the militants were also theological students 
trained in Saudi colleges, but not all were Saudi citizens
139
. This kind of attack was 
new, since it came from inside the Islamic fold, and it brought considerable 
ramifications for the Saudi leadership. It demonstrated to the Saudi government for 
the first time that their centres for religious education were no longer teaching just 
the approved Wahhabi syllabus, but that other ideologies were influencing a whole 
generation of students. The attack on the Grand Mosque represented an attack on the 
legitimacy of the al-Saud’s grip on power, but it was not just the monarchy whose 
legitimacy was challenged. For the ulema, the seizure was a direct threat to their 
authority too, as it threatened their standing not just in the eyes of the Saudi rulers 
but in the eyes of Muslims worldwide. Since the event brought the entire Wahhabi 
establishment under scrutiny, and led to government aims to introduce alternatives to 
the Wahhabi ulema
140
 in order to reduce its influence, they were quick to denounce 
the militants’ actions. 
Although Kepel believes that al-Utaybi was directly influenced in his theology by 
Ibn Baz, the cleric condemned al-Utaybi on the basis that his actions encouraged 
fitna (disorder and discord) within an Islamic country, yet he refused to pronounce 
the militants apostates
141
. During the seizure, Ibn Baz made a series of 
proclamations, including the statements that a true Wahhabi state should not 
associate with any non-Muslims, and that only one version of Islam is permitted
142
. 
These views reflect a fatwa (legal opinion) which he issued in the 1940s in which he 
declared that no non-Muslim should be employed in the Arabian Gulf; this fatwa 
was still in circulation in 2004
143
. Ibn Baz was viewed as relatively independent by 
both the Saudi royal family and the Wahhabi ulema, and his influence was therefore 
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sought by both parties; the government wanted Ibn Baz to temper the radicalism of 
dissident thinkers and buttress government policy, while radical Wahhabi militants 
sought his lenience
144
. As a reaction to al-Utaybi’s attempted revolution, the 
government attempted to reclaim religious authority and legitimacy. Despite 
implementing greater social controls, they found it necessary to allow religious 
opposition voices to be heard, in order that they could try and temper its radicalism 
and prevent people turning to more extreme doctrines. 
Directly inspired by the Grand Mosque seizure, the sahwa which began in the early 
1980s brought new ideas to establishment Wahhabism. Sahwa thinkers were more 
activist than their traditional counterparts, and taught a hybrid of their native 
Wahhabi Islam and imported Qutbist ideas. Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awda 
were known as the standard-bearers of this sahwa movement, but a number of 
young, radicalised Saudis such as al-Qami, al-Awaji and al-Qasim also preached 
their doctrine widely. For al-Hawali, sovereignty lies with Allah alone and therefore 
cannot be assumed by men, and this is the sole criterion which differentiates an 
Islamic state from a jahiliyya state
145
. Al-Hawali’s opinion on this matter came 
straight from the ideas of Qutb and Mawdudi, and is foreign to Wahhabi ideology
146
, 
since it represents a direct challenge to the Saudi monarchy. He contended that the 
monarchy governed according to their own interests, politically and financially, and 
therefore did not rule in line with divine hakimiyya (sovereignty)
147
. A more severe 
accusation is the claim that those who fail to govern in accordance with Allah’s 
commands are kuffar (unbelievers), and this line thinking assumed greater 
importance when al-Hawali wrote a dissertation on the subject
148
. Al-Hawali used 
sermons and cassettes, and later the internet, to spread his teachings throughout the 
Kingdom, becoming a figure of opposition against the Wahhabi ulema who remained 
in control of official Islam in Saudi Arabia. Despite their often destabilising 
messages, the sahwa preachers were allowed to continue their teaching as long as 
they supported the Saudi government when called upon. Tellingly, when the Saudi 
leadership needed to restore moral order and political calm in the mid- to late-80s, it 
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was the sahwa preachers rather than the Wahhabi ulema that they turned to
149
, as this 
new generation of religious teachers had considerable influence over the population.  
Sahwa preachers gained followers from the wide swathes of young Saudis who had 
become alienated by the economic and ideological disparities of Saudi society at the 
end of the twentieth century. Boosted too by the success of the jihad in Afghanistan, 
they were outspoken critics of the decision to allow US troops onto Saudi soil during 
the Gulf War. Al-Hawali saw this as an attempt to control and destroy Islam
150
, and 
both he and al-Awda openly supported Osama bin Laden’s condemnation of the 
monarchy for allowing this
151
. Al-Hawali said of the decision, “to defend ourselves 
we have invited the help of our real enemies... The point is that we need internal 
change. The first war should be against the infidels inside. Then we will be strong 
enough to face our external enemy”152. So al-Hawali’s stance against the monarchy 
during the Gulf War demonstrated just how deeply the religious nationalism of the 
Muslim Brotherhood had penetrated Saudi society, in particular through the higher 
educational institutions which had employed foreign Muslim Brothers
153
. Al-Awda 
preached along slightly less revolutionary lines, but the impact of Muslim 
Brotherhood ideology was clear on him too, when he proposed a religiously-based, 
non-Saudi identity for Saudi Arabia’s citizens, that took as its primary focus the 
notion of Arabia holding a special place within Islam
154
. In September 1994, both 
men were arrested, and Osama bin Laden cited this event as convincing him of the 
duplicity of the al-Saud dynasty
155
. Although their doctrines seemed to make any 
compromise with the monarchy unworkable, the main figures of the sahwa were 
eventually co-opted by the Saudi government, and when they needed religious 
support in the late 1990s, the sahwa acted as a bulwark against criticism for them. 
Both al-Awda and al-Hawali turned against bin Laden when his attitude became 
more extreme; al-Awda was to abandon his former Qutbist thinking and become 
sympathetic towards the government, condemning the 9/11 attacks on his own 
website and identifying himself as an opponent of terrorism, and al-Hawali also 
denounced terrorism as an unacceptable departure from the just struggle between 
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Islam and dar al-kufr (the land of disbelief), but did not give up his more radical 
discourse completely
156
.  
The history of Saudi Arabia is inextricably linked with the history of Wahhabi Islam. 
Since its inception, the Saudi state has called upon Islam to legitimate its leadership, 
and as such Wahhabism has been transformed into a political tool. In the latter half 
of the twentieth century, immigration and a greater amount of transnational 
interaction meant that Islam in Saudi Arabia could not escape external influences. 
Immigrants to the country, particularly those from Egypt and Syria who were 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, brought with them a more activist worldview. 
Some aspects of these new ideologies, especially Sayyid Qutb’s notions of jahiliyya 
society and the need for a literal, physical hijra, went on to influence both national 
and global terrorists from the 1980s onwards, but these extreme ideas were never 
part of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings. With the boom in oil wealth, the Saudi 
government were able to establish the MWL and OIC, and these organisations 
continue to play an important role in international politics in the Muslim world. 
Increased prosperity also allowed Saudi Arabia to undertake mosque-building 
projects and distribution of Islamic material worldwide. Yet at home, the Saudi 
monarchy still had to contend with dissatisfaction from among the sahwa, the 
establishment ulema, and some Saudi youth. 
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5. Wahhabism Islam and the Afghan Jihad 
Aside from supporting the sahwa and employing the ulema to their advantage, 
another way in which the monarchy restored calm in the 1980s was to back the anti-
Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. For Saudi Arabia, the conflict represented a golden 
opportunity to send the most outspoken critics and potentially disruptive Saudi 
citizens to a foreign field, where the jihad could divert their attention from domestic 
issues
157
. This was a convenient way for the Saudi monarchy to be seen to be 
upholding their Wahhabi values, and supporting fellow Muslims. With the new oil 
wealth and financial networks in place, Saudi Arabia was also able to heavily finance 
the mujahedeen, and so keep radical Sunni militants sympathetic to Saudi causes and 
Wahhabi Islam. The jihad was viewed as an instance of dar al-Islam versus dar al-
kufr, and so led to a period of cooperation between Wahhabi groups and others, 
which was fuelled by the jihad and did not last after its end. The Afghan war 
superseded the Palestinian struggle in the eyes of many Islamists, both moderate and 
radical, denoting the move away from nationalism to Islamism
158
 by those with 
politically active tendencies. In many cases, proselytising was seen as the way to 
substitute Islam for the assorted nationalist movements which were waning 
rapidly
159
. In particular, uprooted Afghan youth appeared as a good target for 
Wahhabi proselytising
160
, which was often transmitted through Saudi-sponsored 
madrasas. Supported by the United States, Wahhabism became a liberation theology 
which could deliver Afghanistan from the grip of communism
161
. 
In the short term, the Afghan jihad had considerable benefits for the Saudi 
leadership, but the competing ideologies which fighters encountered there led to a 
hybridisation of some of the most extreme doctrines of Sunni militancy. Those 
fighting in Afghanistan included members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Muslim 
Brothers and salafists from various countries. In particular, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s 
doctrines spread to many of the jihadists. He rejected any notion of political 
participation:  
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...for Muslims to found a party was an act of heresy, elections were 
blasphemous and democracy was tantamount to unbelief. As a result, 
anyone even remotely involved in politics was a heretic who had 
strayed from the path of the Prophet. The only way to get rid of the 
tyrants, the infidels and the apostates was jihad.
162
 
His emphasis on armed struggle led to a polarisation of beliefs among the jihadists. 
Those who agreed with al-Zawahiri’s ideas turned against the traditional Islamist 
parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood and even HAMAS and the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) of Algeria, since they had ambitions to participate fully in the 
political processes of their respective countries. Another important ideologue of 
jihadism was Abdullah Azzam, and he was to become the leading figure of the jihad 
movement of the 1980s. Kepel places Azzam within a tradition of jihad which can 
be traced through the Hanbali school, and to Ibn Taymiyya in particular
163
. While his 
ideas may not have been new, he put them into practice and popularised the concept 
of armed Islamic struggle that was later developed by other radical activists in the 
1990s
164
. Azzam then is the key link between an ideological conception of jihad and 
the actual implementation of physical struggle. As a professor of Islamic philosophy 
at King Abdul Aziz University, he was a crucial connection between the ‘Afghan 
Arabs’ and Wahhabi interests in Saudi Arabia165. 
As members of the mujahedeen returned to the wider world, they took their extreme 
and often violent worldviews with them; this accounts for the dramatic rise in 
terrorist activity after the end of the Afghan jihad. Having moved away from their 
mujahedeen allies, these terrorists were disconnected from social reality and from 
their traditional networks of support and assistance. Ultimately, those returning from 
Afghanistan were beyond the control of any government, and were isolated from 
society and social norms. They viewed the world through a prism of religious dogma 
and armed violence, and went on to inspire new, hybrid Islamists whose principle 
ideology was to justify the existence and behaviour of these militants; these were the 
“jihadist-salafis”166. According to Kepel, they held al-Hawali and al-Awda in high 
regard, combining their proclivity for literal interpretations of the sacred texts with 
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an absolute commitment to jihad
167
. Any group with political aims was rejected out 
of hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood was especially condemned for its moderate 
and gradualist approach. Even Sayyid Qutb’s philosophies were abandoned by some 
of the jihadist-salafis, because his personal interpretations of the Quran were not 
viewed as authoritative canonical commentary (tafsir)
168
. Unlike some terrorist 
groups such as Jamaat al-Muslimin (The Muslim Group, commonly known as Takfir 
wal-Hijra, Excommunication and Exodus), jihadist-salafis focused upon engagement 
with, rather than rejection of, society. Physical withdrawal from a jahiliyya society is 
discounted in favour of an active struggle against that society. Yet many of the 
jihadist-salafis are both isolated and isolationist in their outlook; the world in which 
they inhabit cannot be penetrated by outside ideas and influences. So a gradual 
process of ‘privatisation’ of jihad occurred, since the militants now had no state-
approved outlet for their jihadist tendencies; this was to lead to the new and 
devastating forms of terrorism of the 1990s and beyond. People whom the Saudi 
monarchy had previously viewed as harmless suddenly became real and direct 
threats to Saudi stability.  
While the Afghan jihadists were unable to win over large numbers of new recruits to 
their cause, or to successfully instigate the overthrow of rulers in Muslim-majority 
states, most of these militants continued to focus on the enemy within, the governing 
structures in the Muslim world
169
. However, the most radical switched their target 
from this ‘near enemy’ to the ‘far enemy’, making their struggle a truly global one 
for the first time. These then became the global jihadists, and would go on to wage 
their terrorist campaigns in numerous countries, both with a Muslim- and non-
Muslim-majority. Although initially backed by Saudi funding, Wahhabi doctrine did 
not supply the philosophies of the Afghan jihad. These came most notably from al-
Zawahiri and Azzam, and it is the hybridisation of these extreme doctrines of Sunni 
militancy which paved the way for the development of global jihadism. 
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6. The Ideology of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda 
Obviously, one of the most important figures in the global jihadist movement of the 
last two decades was Osama bin Laden. Despite being a Saudi citizen, bin Laden’s 
ideology was informed by more than his Wahhabi upbringing. When he attended 
King Abd-al-Aziz University, bin Laden’s course of Islamic Studies was taught by 
Muhammad Qutb
170
. It was here that he also first encountered Abdallah Azzam. By 
the time he had left the university, his worldview was heavily influenced by both his 
native Saudi Wahhabism, and by the doctrine and philosophy of the Muslim 
Brotherhood
171
, in its more radical, Qutbist sense. In 1982, bin Laden travelled to 
Afghanistan to participate in the anti-Soviet jihad, and made a name for himself 
through his fund-raising activities. Kepel notes that bin Laden’s trigger to take part 
in the Afghan jihad was the psychological and cultural dissociation he felt, typical of 
affluent Saudi youth, whose piety tends to be strongest whilst at home in Saudi 
Arabia
172
. Through primarily Saudi donations and with the help of Azzam, he was 
able to open a house for Arab jihadists in Peshawar in 1984, and by 1986 he had 
opened training camps for mujahedeen fighters
173
. The database of jihadists which he 
started to keep after 1988 was to put in place the beginnings of the structure for al-
Qaeda (The Base). In Afghanistan, bin Laden also came into contact with al-
Zawahiri, and began to adopt his view that jihad as armed struggle was the only way 
to rid Muslims of ‘apostate’ leaders. Although Fandy claims that bin Laden believed 
himself to be the legitimate heir of al-Wahhab, DeLong-Bas finds no evidence of this 
since bin Laden frequently quoted Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim, but not Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab
174. Ruthven also points out that bin Laden’s language resonates with the 
ideas of Ibn Tumart, not Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
175
. It is clear that during his time at 
university, bin Laden’s worldview was shaped by the ideas of the Qutb brothers and 
Abdallah Azzam, and not by traditional Wahhabi teachings. 
The Gulf War of 1990-91 significantly altered Saudi Arabia’s standing in the Islamic 
world, and fundamentally changed the way in which Osama bin Laden viewed the 
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Saudi monarchy. When Operation Desert Shield was carried out in August 1990, 
more than half a million US troops were stationed on Saudi soil. Just as it had during 
the Grand Mosque seizure, Saudi Arabia appeared reliant on outside, Western forces. 
The reinforcing of ties with the West added to the murmurings of dissent in the 
country, and led bin Laden to revise his opinion that the monarchy was legitimate 
but mistaken in their rule, to the view that the monarchy was wholly illegitimate. It 
was this abhorrence of the Saudi monarchy which was to turn bin Laden away from 
state-sanctioned Islamist activism and jihadist activity to terrorism. The religious 
legitimacy of the Saudi leadership was unable to withstand the criticism heaped upon 
it by internal and external sources; Saudi Arabia had reached the limits of its ability 
to control opinion in the Islamic world. The only factor which helped protect the 
monarchy from wider disapproval during and immediately after the Gulf War was 
their record of financial assistance across the Muslim world
176
. So the Gulf War led 
to a division within Saudi Arabia between those loyal to the monarchy and those 
who favoured the new Islamism that had emerged in the country, which was 
claiming to act on behalf of Wahhabism but was actually directed against the royal 
family
177
. Those now opposed to the dynasty, including some members of the liberal 
middle classes, began to call for more political openness and strongly condemned the 
Westernisation of the country
178
. The Saudi monarchy had to turn once more to their 
Wahhabi ulema for support. In 1993, Ibn Baz proclaimed that it was the duty of 
Muslims everywhere to obey their ruler and the ulema, and strongly denounced the 
denigration of the Saudi leadership on the grounds that it could engender the 
destabilisation of society and thus would amount to ‘revolt’, something unacceptable 
in Islam; only when the government acted ‘un-Islamically’ could people offer 
criticism and advice to the ruler
179
. 
 
For Osama bin Laden, the Gulf War was the trigger to put into practice the jihadist 
ideology which he had cultivated in Afghanistan. Aware of the possible dangers of 
his teachings, the Saudi government revoked his citizenship in April 1994, 
preventing him from returning to his native country. On November 13
th
, 1995, a car 
bomb was detonated inside the National Guard training centre in Riyadh, killing 7 
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people and injuring about 60 mostly US citizens. The terrorists on this occasion were 
young Saudis, whose affiliated groups had previously warned that US and UK 
military personnel would become legitimate targets if they remained on Saudi 
Arabian soil after June 1995
180
. Three of the terrorists were veterans of the Afghan 
war, including one, al-Shamrani, who had been a member of Osama bin Laden’s 
Farouq Brigade, and another was a student of the writings of bin Laden and the 
ideologies of Al-Gamaat al-Islamiya (The Egyptian Islamic Group) and Al-Jihad
181
. 
Although bin Laden praised this, and the later Khobar Towers truck bombing, he had 
no direct connection with either attack
182
. 
Until the mid-1990s, bin Laden was viewed by the American government as an 
opposition figure of the Saudi regime. However that changed in 1996, during what 
Kepel terms as the “hinge year” for al-Qaeda, since it was when ideological and 
strategic decisions were made that would ultimately culminate in the attacks of 
September 11
th
, 2001
183
. On August 23
rd
, 1996, bin Laden changed the focus of his 
jihad when he issued the ‘Declaration of Jihad against the US’, making his primary 
objective the expulsion of US forces from Saudi Arabian soil. The first of al-
Qaeda’s spectacular international attacks came on the eighth anniversary of the 
arrival of US troops in Saudi Arabia; the 1998 bombings of the American embassies 
in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam killed over 220 people, and injured more than 4500. 
However until the end of the twentieth century, the Saudi dynasty remained the 
primary focus of bin Laden’s struggle, with his main contention being that the Saudi 
leaders were not governing in accordance with Islam, and therefore should be 
deposed. His attempts to mobilise large numbers of Saudi citizens to revolt failed, 
because just as it had been during the Gulf War, the Saudi monarchy and the official 
ulema were protected from criticism due to their record of financial assistance to 
Muslims across the globe.  
Bin Laden’s activities have frequently been associated with Wahhabi Islam, yet this 
cannot be correct for the fundamental reason that his fight was directed at the Saudi 
monarchy and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine explicitly forbade any form of 
revolutionary activity or civil disobedience aimed at those that govern. Just as when 
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the Ikhwan fought Abd al-Aziz, and when al-Utaybi and his followers seized the 
Grand Mosque, bin Laden felt that the Saudi leadership had breached Islamic ideals 
and was therefore a legitimate target for revolutionary action. This conviction had its 
basis not in pure Wahhabi ideology, but in a hybrid of Islamic beliefs. Most 
obviously, al-Qaeda built onto a Wahhabi framework a combination of 
revolutionary Qutbist thought, and jihadist activism from Afghanistan. This jihadist 
doctrine originally came from Abdullah Azzam and al-Zawahiri, and members of 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad
184, not from bin Laden’s Wahhabi background. The doctrines 
of al-Qaeda and its associates differ significantly from the teachings of Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, yet similarities with Wahhabi ideology are to be found in two key areas. 
Firstly, in the concept of din wa-dawla (religion and state), the idea that religion is 
inseparable from the state, since the state is based on and operates according to 
Islam
185
. Therefore, a ruler must act in line with Islam, upholding its values and 
protecting Islam from that which threatens it. Secondly, both Wahhabism and al-
Qaeda view their members as the elite, the epitome of an Islamic society, and Kepel 
believes that the archetype of the ‘vanguard’ in bin Laden’s propaganda was the 
devoutly religious yet activist community immediately after the Wahhabi-Saudi 
alliance
186
.  
The clear distinction between one’s own followers and other people, both Muslim 
and non-Muslim, and the perceived necessity to separate oneself from them enables 
easier categorisation of the ‘other’ and helps justify violence, whether this is as part 
of a movement of conquest in the history of Saudi Arabia, or as terrorist activity in 
the modern, wider world. The demarcation between Wahhabi and non-Wahhabi, 
alongside the notion of an external enemy, helped to create and maintain the modern 
state of Saudi Arabia, and allowed its form of Islam to flourish. While the separation 
of believers and non-believers was a distinct part of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s ideology, 
it can be seen as playing an important role in many communities, religious and non-
religious, across the globe. The creation of the ‘other’, whether done consciously or 
unconsciously, is a normal part of identity formation for individuals and groups; the 
very notion of a community requires that boundaries are constructed which separate 
it from those around it, and inside which a certain identity is shared by all. So 
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Wahhabi Islam is by no means uncommon in upholding a group identity with a 
defined ‘other’, and while there is no doubt that a strongly delineated notion of this 
‘other’ is a major part of any terrorist group’s philosophy, the establishment of the 
sense of internal and external does not automatically mean that violence will occur 
as a result. For Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and subsequent generations of his followers, the 
‘other’ is merely a tool which strengthens the conception of the ummah and so 
enables Wahhabi Muslims to identify with one another and form a strong community 
bond, even if they are thousands of miles apart. 
Osama bin Laden’s extreme views developed after he came into contact with 
Qutbian ideology, and later the ideas of Azzam and al-Zawahiri. The revocation of 
his Saudi citizenship in 1994 was a measure designed to protect the Saudi 
government from his revolutionary calls, but it also demonstrates how far removed 
from Wahhabi doctrine his ideas were, since they were condemned by Ibn Baz and 
the leading ulema. However, the close relationship between Saudi Arabia and the 
United States during the Gulf War significantly damaged the Saudi monarchy’s 
standing in the Islamic world, something they would struggle to restore in the 
coming years. 
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7. Terrorist Ideologies 
So while the doctrines of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda share little in common 
with Wahhabi Islam, is there an overlap between the ideologies of any other terrorist 
organisations and Wahhabism? Here I will briefly discuss some of the most 
significant groups of recent years and any key similarities or differences with 
Wahhabi Islam, but do not have the space to examine their philosophies in depth. 
Firstly, Jama’at al-Muslimin, or Takfir wal Hijra, which was formed in Egypt in the 
1960s and was active throughout the latter decades of the 20
th
 century. The group 
advocated total withdrawal from society and thus takes a different approach to that 
taught by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, which chooses to engage with society in order to 
change it through dawa. Also, the founder of the group, Shukri Mustafa, was not a 
salafi since he interpreted the Quran in such a way as to fit his own ideologies, rather 
than vice versa
187
. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, Boko Haram and Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen 
(Mujahideen Youth Movement) are currently waging terror campaigns in their own 
countries. For the last decade, Boko Haram has preached against Nigeria’s Muslim 
establishment and any interaction with the western world, yet it is only since 2009 
that it has transformed itself into a salafist jihadist organisation which has adopted 
terrorism as a routine practice. Other than its “tenuous”188 links with Saudi 
missionaries and its desire to implement sharia, Boko Haram’s ideology has no 
connections with that of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and its focus is on Nigeria rather than a 
global terror campaign. Similarly, al-Shabaab of Somalia, a takfiri salafist jihadist 
organisation, bears little doctrinal resemblance to Wahhabi Islam. The group has 
many foreign fighters, predominantly from Egypt and Libya, and counts some 
Saudis among its ranks too, but this does not mean it advocates a Wahhabi 
worldview. Indeed, in recent years it has drawn its ideology close to that of the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda in order to appeal to a wider audience outside Somalia 
itself
189
. The Abu Sayyaf Group (Bearer of the Sword), based in the Philippines, aims 
to form an Islamic state in the Philippines and worldwide. Its founder, Abdurajik 
Janjalani, spent time fighting in the Afghan jihad, and expressed salafi views and 
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support for the Taliban
190
. Unlike the inclusive politics of the Moro National 
Liberation Front in the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf advocates an exclusivist and 
sectarian worldview
191
 that could be compared to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s but that 
could equally come from a number of other sources.  
Several groups in Pakistan have been accused of terrorism, among them Lashkar e-
Taiba (The Army of the Pure). Founded in 1990, this group recruits educated 
Muslims, including some from Saudi Arabia
192
. Its ideology has been associated 
with Wahhabi Islam, but I believe this is because of purported links between 
Lashkar e-Taiba and al-Qaeda, and the superficial similarities of al-Qaeda and 
Wahhabism. It may also be because Lashkar e-Taiba has veterans of the Afghan 
jihad as members of its organisation, some of which may of course be from Saudi 
Arabia originally. Lashkar e-Jhangvi (The Army of Jhangvi) has links to the 
Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, but other than its anti-
Shia stance, has no connection with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings; indeed the 
majority of Pakistani extremist groups are radical Deobandis not Wahhabis
193
. Sipah 
i-Sahaba has also perpetrated violence against Shias, and is so extreme that it 
considers Shias to be non-Muslims
194
. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s anti-Shia stance is clear, 
yet other people and groups espouse an anti-Shia stance too, and it is not in itself a 
progenitor of terrorism. Most of these groups have no declared interest in global 
jihad, and are focused instead on regional struggles. Combined with their differing 
ideologies they thus neither fit beneath the Wahhabi or global terrorist labels.  
Other groups have been connected with global terrorism whilst not perpetrating 
terrorist acts themselves. Al-Mujahiroun (The Emigrants) glorifies terrorism as the 
way to achieve its goal of a universal caliphate, and is banned in both Saudi Arabia 
and Britain. Its main aim has been described as the establishment of Islamic states 
through military coups
195
, and its proscription by the Saudi government indicates 
that this is not an ideology familiar to or supported by those with a Wahhabi 
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worldview. With similar aims to al-Mujahiroun, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party) 
also wants the re-establishment of the caliphate and the widespread implementation 
of sharia. Rashid says that they view the physical seizure of power as the only way 
to implement sharia, and that this view comes from a hybrid Deobandi-Wahhabi 
tradition
196
. Whilst Ibn Abd al-Wahhab called for the execution of sharia he 
preached against revolutionary action, and when al-Utaybi and his followers seized 
the Grand Mosque in 1979, the Wahhabi establishment widely condemned his 
actions. I would therefore question Rashid’s assertion that physical seizure of power 
can come out of a reading of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings. Although professing a 
policy of non-violence, the connection of Hizb ut-Tahrir with terrorism has led to it 
being banned in some countries. Certain aspects of its ideology, in particular the 
enforced segregation of the sexes and the rejection of non-Islamic influences, 
overlap with that of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, yet as discussed earlier none of these are in 
themselves a precursor to terrorist activity. It is however likely that Hizb ut-Tahrir 
and groups like it could act as conduits to more radical groups, particularly for 
younger followers. 
The groups mentioned above are some of the most significant terrorist groups of 
recent years, yet there are few connections to be found between them. Although 
there is very little ideological information available about many of these groups, 
there seems to be little or no Wahhabi influence on them. However there are two 
groups with terrorist associations, about which more information is obtainable and 
which both have alleged links with Wahhabi thought and practice; these groups are 
important in the history of Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Arabia.  
Firstly, the Taliban in Afghanistan, an organisation which has been called “Saudi-
sponsored”197, and which Shughart says attracted the support of some of the Saudi 
royal family, due to its “rejection of modernity” and the overlap of its core tenets 
with Wahhabism
198. Although they were the eventual heirs of Saudi Arabia’s 
financial and military support during the anti-Soviet jihad, the Taliban represented 
an ideology which was based on Hanafi Deobandism, not on Wahhabi Islam. With 
its traditional madrassa training, the Deobandi school could potentially mobilise 
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hundreds of thousands of students in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and so could be a 
fertile breeding ground for jihadist theories
199
. Yet the Taliban had no international 
political or religious agenda until they began to adopt the ideology of Osama bin 
Laden and his associates from around 1996 onwards. It was the jihadists who based 
themselves in Afghanistan after the end of the Soviet occupation who were to shape 
the global vision that the group adopted at the very end of the twentieth century. The 
Taliban came to depend on these foreign fighters just as exiled groups and 
individuals turned to the Taliban for asylum. Ultimately, bin Laden and his closest 
allies became an intrinsic part of the Taliban’s decision-making process200, and by 
2001 the Taliban’s domestic political aims had been surpassed by the internationalist 
agenda of the Arab jihadists. Although certain aspects of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s dawa 
overlap with Deobandism, the Taliban’s radicalism can be understood as a fusion of 
Deobandism, jihadist ideology and traditional Afghan concepts of tribal norms and 
social justice; Wahhabi Islam plays little or no part in their worldview. Indeed, when 
the Taliban refused to hand Osama bin Laden to Saudi authorities, Saudi Arabia 
ended their official relations with the Taliban, and removed their diplomats from 
Kabul in 1998
201
.  
Secondly, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is allegedly funded by 
Saudi sources. Rashid compares the IMU to the Taliban, since he says both are 
global jihadist groups which ignore greater jihad, and adopt lesser jihad as a 
complete social and political philosophy
202
. Viewed as one of the biggest threats to 
stability in the region, the IMU aims to seize power in Uzbekistan and replace it with 
its own sharia-centred Islamic state. Rashid writes that, “[t]he Pakistani extremist 
groups Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Sipah-i-Sahaba, initially funded by Saudi Arabia, 
have militants fighting with the IMU”203. He goes on to say that Saudi Arabia is 
viewed as a serious risk to Central Asian states, as “Saudi Arabia has consistently 
backed the most extremist Islamic groups in the region... and the Saudi regime has 
made no attempt to stop the lavish funding of the IMU from the Saudi-Uzbek 
diaspora in Mecca and Medina”204. The issue of Saudi funding and Wahhabi 
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influence in Central Asia is a contentious one, and can be traced back to the end of 
the Afghan jihad. Saudi funds were then being transmitted not just to the Wahhabi 
leaders of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, but also to leaders in Central Asia, as 
many had been trained in Saudi-funded madrassas
205
.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, power vacuums arose in many former Soviet 
states, and years of civil war, political repression and economic hardships provided a 
receptive audience for new ideas. Kepel notes that once the mujahedeen had seized 
Kabul in April 1992, around 4000 humanitarian organisations, mostly Saudi 
Arabian, turned their attentions to Bosnia
206
. The MWL was also employed in 
sending financial assistance to the country. Wahhabi charities have sent missionaries 
and Islamic literature to other Central Asian states too, including millions of Qurans 
translated into native languages, but it is possible that with this comes a wish to turn 
Central Asian Muslims towards Wahhabism
207
. The type of charity most often 
provided by Saudi organisations is based on dawa, propagating the Wahhabi version 
above native forms of Islam; this in itself is not dangerous, but could result in a 
decrease in local variations within Islam, as Wahhabi teachers will naturally lean to 
developing a Wahhabi religious identity among the Muslims under their instruction. 
The distribution of books and pamphlets based on salafi doctrine, and the financial 
and methodological aid from Islamic foundations in the Gulf States has resulted in 
the penetration of salafism into the local Islamic educational structure in the Volga-
Urals
208
. Similarly,  
In [Bosnia Herzegovina], the Saudi-funded King Fahd mosque 
complex has...been associated with small groups of Islamic militants 
and with the missionary efforts of the Saudi Wahhabi version of 
Islam. Some of the same Gulf groups that financed the King Fahd 
mosque have also financed the destruction of some of the major 
traditional Islamic centres...with the aim of replacing these traditional 
buildings with large, Gulf-style structures.
209
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In many of the former Soviet states, all forms of Islam which are considered to be 
potentially dangerous or disruptive are referred to as salafi or ‘Wahhabi’. Social 
unrest and the failure of states has fuelled the rise of more radical forms of Islam in 
Central Asia, as opposed to the traditional, often Sufi-dominated state-sponsored 
Islam of these regions. In particular, in the northern Caucasus, violence and even 
terrorism attributed to Islam has occurred as radical Islamists seek to overthrow 
existing state structures and replace them with Islamic ones. Some of these militants 
fought in the anti-Soviet jihad, adopted the jihadist attitude which they encountered 
in Afghanistan and have translated it to other states, in particular Chechnya. There is 
no doubt that radical Islam has had a significant and sometimes deadly impact in 
Central Asia since the early 1990s, but to label this form of non-native Islam as 
‘Wahhabi’ is misleading and uninformed. The ideologies of militants active in the 
region have often been informed by the jihadist attitude, and while Saudi foundations 
provide financial assistance to Muslims in Central Asia, Wahhabi Islam does not 
supply the revolutionary tendency or the propensity for violence which is prevalent 
among the radicals. Regarding the IMU specifically, its programme of action and 
methodologies, particularly the use of terrorism as a political tool, are not reflective 
of a Wahhabi worldview. In fact, the veterans of the Afghan jihad who later fought 
for the Taliban, the IMU and in Chechnya, actually posed a significant threat to 
Saudi security
210
. Having adopted the rejection of political participation from al-
Zawahiri, and the concept of violent revolutionary jihad from Azzam, these 
radicalised jihadists turned their attentions to Saudi Arabia and its monarchy. 
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8. Wahhabi Islam in Present-day Saudi Arabia 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, bombings in Saudi Arabia have been 
a fairly frequent occurrence. Until 2003, these were mostly small and directed at 
individual Westerners, but the suicide car bombings carried out on May 12
th
, 2003, 
which killed about thirty-five people and wounded hundreds more, forced Saudi 
authorities to crack down on terrorist activity in the kingdom. Hundreds of raids and 
arrests followed and the most radical of clerics were silenced, but major attacks 
continued throughout 2004. These included the killing of twenty-two people at the 
al-Khobar residential complex, which an offshoot of al-Qaeda claimed responsibility 
for. Tawil writes: 
Bin Laden’s organisation had relied all along on a bedrock of Gulf 
support, money and manpower. It was, therefore, no surprise that al-
Qa`ida’s first franchise to emerge after the fall of the Taliban 
appeared in its leader’s home country, Saudi Arabia. Al Qa`ida’s 
conflict with the security services encompassed the entire Gulf region, 
but it was in the Saudi kingdom that the organisation carried out most 
of its attacks and suffered the worst of its setbacks.
211
 
It was perhaps predictable that after the destruction of their infrastructure in 
Afghanistan after 2001, many jihadists would seek another base for their operations. 
Indeed, Hegghammer writes that the reason for the upsurge in terrorism in Saudi 
Arabia was the returning Saudi Afghan Arabs who wanted the liberation of the 
Arabian peninsula from US occupation
212
. Saudi authorities had clearly failed to 
either co-opt jihadism, or to curb its violent activism
213
; their sponsorship of the 
Afghan jihad and policy of accommodation towards radicals had backfired. 
However, Saudi citizens largely condemned this terrorism on their own soil, 
particularly when Muslims were the victims of attacks, and would-be terrorists found 
they were unable to mobilise large numbers of people to their cause. Establishment 
ulema were also quick to denounce the attackers, and terrorists found it increasingly 
hard to legitimate their actions. Indeed, as early as 1988, the Board of Senior Ulema 
issued a fatwa which deemed terrorism a capital crime. “The Board’s fatwa included 
‘blowing up houses, mosques, schools, hospitals, factories, bridges, storehouses of 
arms or water, sources of public revenue such as oil wells, or by blowing up or 
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hijacking airplanes’.”214 Without mass support, terrorism became far more 
decentralised, and many of the attacks from 2005 onwards were from individuals not 
affiliated with al-Qaeda. This was also, in part, due to the success which the Saudi 
authorities had in killing or capturing high-ranking members of al-Qaeda in Saudi 
Arabia, and as a coherent organisation inside the country it has now largely been 
destroyed. During 2004 alone, security services arrested or killed twenty-three of 
their twenty-six most wanted terrorists
215
. Yet young Saudi men inclined to armed 
jihad have found a new outlet for violence in Iraq: “Unlike the mujahidin who fought 
in Afghanistan in the 1980s, today’s militants do not benefit from official support; 
indeed, the Kingdom openly condemns foreign jihad and has been pressuring clerics 
to denounce it.”216 These militants, like their jihadist predecessors, developed their 
worldview through a combination of ideas and philosophies, not as a direct result of 
Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia. Ironically, the domestic attacks of the last decade 
have reduced the authority of traditionalists and hard-liners within the Saudi 
establishment, and have actually handed more power to those who wish to modernise 
the kingdom. As Lacey notes, “9/11 finally settled who ruled whom in Saudi 
Arabia... [The] monarchy decided ‘Rulers must rule, and the religious must go along 
with that’.”217  
Anxious to augment establishment Wahhabism against radical clerics, the Saudi 
authorities gave the ulema greater powers after the Grand Mosque seizure, especially 
in education and over public morality. Often criticised for spreading intolerance and 
even ideas which lead to terrorism, Coulson believes that “the message of hate, 
suspicion and intolerance delivered by Saudi Arabia’s schools appears to have been 
internalized by a considerable segment of the population ... [and] the Saudi education 
threat is substantially magnified by the country’s aggressive campaign to export it 
around the world”218. Yet Commins finds that Saudi school textbooks actually 
espouse a Muslim Brotherhood-oriented vision of the West as a direct threat to 
Muslims, not a purely Wahhabi worldview
219
. Aware of the criticisms regarding 
education from outside Saudi Arabia, and provoked by instances of domestic 
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terrorism, the government has made some alterations to textbooks since 2001, and as 
part of its programme of modernisation, control of state education institutions has 
passed from the ulema to the secular Ministry of Education. However, the education 
system in Saudi Arabia has been influenced by external sources since the arrival of 
Muslim Brotherhood members in the 1960s, and since then state education has 
embodied a substantial departure from traditional Wahhabi instruction
220
. Therefore, 
the terrorists responsible for 9/11 and domestic attacks in Saudi Arabia are not 
representative products of exposure to a wholly Wahhabi education; their 
worldviews have been influenced by a complex set of ideas and practices of which 
their Wahhabi background is only a small part. Moves to eradicate intolerant 
teachings from textbooks, and secular oversight of education by the government can 
be seen as good first steps to reducing radicalisation among Saudi students. 
The impact of Muslim Brotherhood teachers, sahwa clerics, and non-Wahhabi 
inspired Islamic revivalism spread through new communication technologies, have 
all deeply altered the religious outlook in Saudi Arabia since the 1980s. Wahhabism 
is no longer the only Islamic voice in Saudi Arabia, and as such its hegemony over 
Saudi religious life has been affected. In turn, the ulema are now more dependent 
than ever before on government policy for the maintenance of their income and 
social standing. However, Hiro believes that Saudi ulema still have a far higher 
status and far greater influence than the ulema of any other Sunni country
221
. Unlike 
political opposition parties and Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
and Jamaat-i Islami, the Wahhabi ulema have never believed in mass political 
participation, since Ibn Abd al-Wahhab preached loyalty to a ruler upholding sharia; 
consequently they provide a relatively stable safeguard against political dissent.  
The Saudi government therefore has to tread a careful line between Wahhabi 
traditionalism and the need for modernisation in politics, economics and social life. 
Any changes made are done so slowly, so as not to disrupt the fragile balance of 
Saudi society, yet this excuse can also be used to explain away the monarchy’s 
reluctance to introduce much-needed reforms. Pressure for these reforms frequently 
comes from the more Westernised, and perhaps more secular, upper and upper-
middle classes, but there is pressure too from traditionalists who struggle with many 
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aspects of modernity, particularly the increasingly permeable nature of both national 
and religious boundaries. In order to accommodate both sides, the government often 
couches its reforms in religious language and symbolism. As Hourani points out, “in 
Saudi Arabia, the principles of Hanbali jurisprudence were invoked in order to 
justify the new laws and regulations made necessary by the new economic order”222. 
The Saudi monarchy is acutely aware of the need to adapt to changing domestic and 
global situations, whilst retaining its Islamic credentials. A very slow process of 
secularisation in some areas of government, like education, has helped the monarchy 
to retain control, and in 2009 the most conservative of ulema were removed from the 
government
223
. Initiatives such as the National Dialogues, in which leaders from all 
areas of society are able to participate, are an unprecedented step in Saudi Arabia, 
since the inclusion of Shiites and Sufis, as well as non-Wahhabi Sunnis, admits to 
the pluralism which is actually present in modern Saudi life. However these have not 
been universally popular, and al-Hawali refused to attend the forum of June 2003 
because of the presence of non-Wahhabis
224
. Paradoxically, the threat of terrorism 
can be seen to have prompted conciliations between these diverse sectors of Saudi 
society. Despite the changes to their realms of authority, modernisation does not 
appear to have undermined the importance of the Wahhabi ulema in Saudi Arabia, 
since they remain the sole institution which confers legitimacy on the House of 
Saud’s leadership. This leadership encompasses not only the governance of Saudi 
Arabia, but also the guidance of the global Islamic community.  
 
Saudi Arabia is in a unique position in the Islamic world because of its guardianship 
of Mecca and Medina. Since the hajj is a journey which symbolises the unity of the 
ummah, Saudi management of the pilgrimage was to become one of the most 
important areas of influence for Wahhabi Islam. Indeed, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s dawa 
was able to have a far greater impact on the Muslim world after Saudi forces 
conquered Mecca and Medina in 1803
225
. Pilgrims inspired by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
ideas and practices helped to spread his interpretation of Islam beyond Saudi 
Arabia’s borders. To emphasise his religious credentials, in 1986 King Fahd adopted 
the title “Custodian of the Two Holy Places”, underlining this position of hegemony 
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over Islam
226
. The Saudi monarch can therefore be seen as the head of the ummah, in 
both religious and political terms. Since 1979, at least one and a half million pilgrims 
have made the hajj each year
227, so having control of Islam’s holiest places allows 
not just the Saudi government, but also the Wahhabi ulema to have a great deal of 
authority and influence within the Islamic milieu. The Holy Places are thus an 
intrinsic part of Saudi and Wahhabi power, and are even used as a political tool to 
gain favour in the Muslim world. Through the hajj, Saudi Arabia presents itself to 
other Muslims as a united Islamic community, whose laws and standards of social 
organisation are based on the Quran. The government and ulema also aim to present 
Wahhabi models of thought and behaviour as the correct ones for the wider Muslim 
world to follow, and, aided by the hajj, Wahhabi Islam can be propounded as the 
ideal. 
The hajj is not the only method which is used to propagate Wahhabi Islam 
throughout the world; the flow of migrant labour in and out of the Gulf States, and 
Saudi funding and proselytising activities have helped Wahhabi Islam to gain 
followers not just in Muslim-majority countries, but in Western countries too. This 
has been particularly true within newly-settled immigrant communities, where 
Wahhabism can provide a stable identity and fixed social norms in an uncertain time. 
By propagating Wahhabi Islam across the globe, Saudi Arabia offers a chance for 
Sunnis to create for themselves an identity which emphasises their religiosity and 
religious unity with fellow Muslims. Differences in language, nationality and 
geographical location are thereby reduced, with religion becoming the over arching 
means of identification.  
Investment in charity projects also provides the Saudi government with greater 
legitimacy and influence, yet some charitable organisations have been proscribed by 
the United Nations Security Council for alleged links to terrorist groups. The UN 
Security Council and the US Office of Foreign Assets Control have frozen the 
material assets of some branches of the International Islamic Relief Organisation of 
Saudi Arabia (IIRO) for having links with al-Qaeda and the Taliban
228
. Similarly, 
al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, based in Saudi Arabia, has purported links with 
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Osama bin Laden, so it was jointly designated by the US and Saudi Arabia in March 
2002
229
. As a result of al-Haramain’s connections, Saudi Arabia has increased its 
oversight of charitable foundations based in the Kingdom.  
Perhaps the primary way in which Wahhabi Islam is spread is through Saudi-funded 
mosque-building projects. Since mosques have always been places of instruction and 
socialisation, Saudi Arabia can hope that these mosques will educate Muslims along 
Wahhabi lines, and even replicate certain aspects of Saudi social and religious life 
outside that state. These missionary activities and financing can appear as aggressive 
and imperialist since they promote Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine as the best 
interpretation of Islam, but Saudi Arabia has also funded a variety of other Sunni 
groups. Despite heavy criticism for what has at times seemed indiscriminate 
subvention of Islamic groups, it is probable that Saudi involvement has frequently 
been exaggerated
230
. 
In Saudi Arabia itself, Islam is the core of identity formation, religiously and 
culturally, and Islam in the Wahhabi interpretation remains the unifying factor for 
the majority of Saudi citizens. Adherence to Wahhabi norms and practices affects 
social, economic, educational and political aspects of Saudi society, and they are 
inseparable from governance in the country. Wahhabism is the basis of legitimacy 
not just for the monarchy, but for all of their political institutions, since the first 
article of the Basic Law of Government states that the Quran and Sunnah are the 
constitution of Saudi Arabia. The government and ulema maintain the sharia, but 
efforts have been made in the last two decades to slowly adapt this into a legal 
system more fitting for the contemporary situation
231
. Despite the constitutional 
claims, to some extent the monarchy demarcates limits around its authority and that 
of the ulema
232
, and these restrictions of the ulema have become more obvious in 
recent years as certain areas of traditional authority have been removed from the 
Wahhabi clerics. Yet the role that religion plays in public life has not been reduced; 
the lack of secular sources of authority means that the religious foundations of the 
country are ipso facto relied upon. Wahhabism still appears as a form of social 
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control since it is still the normative form of Islam, and Wahhabi beliefs and 
practices are enforced, sometimes physically, by the mutawwin. Islam remains the 
core legitimising factor for the monarchy, and is appropriated by them as a 
commodity and for use as a political tool.  
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9. Radicalisation, Islamism and Terrorism 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Islamist movement predominated 
amongst politically active Muslims, largely because of an increased awareness in the 
severe inequalities between the richest and the poorest in many Muslim states. Most 
successful in the 1970s and 1980s, by the last decade of the twentieth century 
Islamism was failing to mobilise large numbers of Muslims to its cause. Kepel 
believes that the repeated violence of the Islamist movement during the 1990s, for 
example in Chechnya and during the Algerian civil war, was an indication of the 
movement’s core weakness, rather than its growing strength233. Combined with 
ideologies which came to prominence during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, 
Islamism, with its focus on active struggle, helped to inspire some Muslims with 
violent tendencies to terrorist action. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, we have seen an increase in the role that Islamic 
language plays in politics and political discourse. The main reason for this has been 
the effect of globalisation, and in particular the globalisation of communications, on 
Muslims. On the one hand, increasing access to, and speed of communication 
technologies allows the ummah to unite across time and space. However, rapid 
changes in the roots of identity formation, such as those caused by globalisation, can 
cause a dislocation in identity; Islam could be used as a tool to connect with others, 
and to maintain a stable identity in a swiftly changing world. Unable to live in 
isolation from either non-Muslims or other forms of Islam, many Muslims found that 
the ummah, and the shared values, practices, and even sometimes language that it 
epitomises provided a framework for their Islamic identity. Although the notion of 
the ummah has a distinct religio-political significance, the reality is that the ummah 
is not a single, uniform entity. Rather, due to the pluralism of Islam countless forms 
of Islamic community exist, and these are diverse in their religious and political 
beliefs. Alongside this, for Islamists who were European citizens a change was 
required in the way in which they referred to their countries. Rather than living in the 
dar al-kufr, where a non-Muslim ruler made it impossible to call for the 
implementation of sharia, Islamists began to view Europe as the dar al-Islam 
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domain of Islam)
234
, allowing them to function fully in these non-Muslim majority 
states.  
Furthermore, Silvestri notes the importance of language for terrorists: while the 
perpetrators of the attacks of 9/11, and those in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 
claim to be acting in the name of Islam, and explicitly place themselves within the 
salafist tradition of political Islam, Silvestri is unwilling to define these acts as 
‘Islamic terrorism’, preferring to clarify that we are living in a time when terrorists 
assume and subvert the politically powerful language and symbols of Islam
235
. For 
European states, this form of terrorism which has emerged in the last decade, where 
recruitment strategy depends upon such Islamic symbols and terminology
236
, is 
particularly worrying and hard to combat. Kepel believes that young European 
Muslims can follow one of two distinct paths when exposed to such radical ideas. 
Firstly, they may present an alternative to increasing religiosity which is often used 
to mask authoritarianism, and turn to mainstream Islamist activity to enable 
dispossessed populations to have a voice
237
. Alternatively, they may reject 
integration into European society and adopt a culturally separatist attitude which 
espouses an extremist, rigid Islamic identity
238
. Of this latter group, most will 
explicitly reject violence and will become pietistic in their isolationism from the 
West joining the ranks of the ‘sheikhists’; this term is used because the Islamic path 
followed mirrors that of the non-violent teachings of the establishment ulema and 
sheikhs (leaders) in Saudi Arabia, who demonstrate no hostility to the monarchy
239
. 
The small minority which remains may come to advocate offensive jihad, and will 
likely condemn the regimes of both Muslim and non-Muslim states. But reflecting 
Silvestri’s opinion, Patel believes that Islam cannot be held responsible for the 
violence of certain Muslims, just as generalised violent political reactions to political 
stimuli should not be blamed on Islam
240
. Some individuals will always go outside 
accepted norms in order to implement their own forms of social justice, and 
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instances of this can be found not just within an Islamic setting, but in other 
situations too, both religious and secular.  
Baker notes that it is usually accepted that terrorism cannot be fought by military 
means alone
241
, since military operations can create more enemies than they get rid 
of. This is particularly true today, where the dar al-Islam is no longer restricted to a 
specific geographical region. Unlike during Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s lifetime, differing 
interpretations of Islam, including Wahhabi Islam, now have more means than ever 
before to find followers across the globe rather than just in their native geographical 
areas. Indeed, the importance of the globalisation of communications, especially the 
internet, means that the dar al-Islam occupies just as important a space in the virtual 
world than it does in the physical world. This has meant that official ulema are 
increasingly losing control of Islamic education and knowledge transmission. The 
dynamic nature of many terrorist networks, which employ these most modern of 
technologies is especially difficult to tackle. Websites dedicated to spreading the 
message of terrorist groups are almost impossible to regulate, since when one is 
removed another can merely take its place. Modern terrorism is therefore much 
harder to track down and eliminate, since it relies far less on a physical presence in 
the world, and depends instead on a virtual one. The abundance of radical material 
on the internet, written by unqualified and often misinformed people, is one of the 
most worrying issues in the fight against terrorism. One solution may be for mosques 
to reclaim their traditional place as educational and socialising institutions, 
particularly in urban areas with large populations of young and disaffected Muslims. 
Providing a mainstream alternative to an internet-focused Islamic education, and 
tackling head on the issues on radical websites could help to demonstrate to young 
people how the majority of these most extreme views have no sanction in Islam. 
Engaging with the radicals’ debate, rather than shying away from it, should be the 
first step to refuting their claims and thus loosening their hold on the discourse. 
Another equally important primary stage of eliminating terrorism is to try and stamp 
out the initial causes of radicalism. These underlying issues may be social, economic 
or political in nature. Whereas the terrorist acts carried out in the 1980s and 1990s, 
by groups such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria 
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(GIA), were economically and politically motivated, terrorism in the last decade has 
moved away from being the domain of the socially oppressed and economically 
deprived. The majority of the terrorists on September 11
th
, 2001, were university-
educated young men from economically comfortable backgrounds. Economic 
reasons, often suggested as the primary radicalising factor, are not then the only 
motivation for some turn to terrorism. Political dissatisfaction can be far harder and 
take far longer to alter than disparities in wealth or social standing, and issues which 
have dominated politics in the Islamic world for decades continue to be a key 
incentive for how Muslims align themselves politically today. Most notably, the 
conflict between Israel and Palestine continues to remain a source not just for violent 
activity and sometimes terrorism in the name of religion, but it also affects how the 
wider world is viewed. Its unflinching support for Israel is one reason why the 
United States is frequently named as a target for terrorism. So terrorism can be 
caused by both internal and external factors, but it is the external ones that cause it to 
become a global rather than domestic phenomenon. 
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10. Conclusion 
This study has examined the ideology of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and asked 
whether it can be seen to have been a part of the rise and expansion of terrorism on a 
global scale. While Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s dawa followed certain aspects of ibn 
Taymiyya’s teachings, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab also looked to a variety of other sources, 
including ibn Hanbal. Many of the ideas which Ibn Abd al-Wahhab promulgated as 
part of his creed were not new in Islam; rather, they were core components of Islam 
for the majority of Muslims, and he aimed to take his teachings directly from the 
Quran and hadith. His doctrines can be placed firmly within the Hanbali school, and 
as such did not represent any form of deviation from orthodox Islam: “Ibn Abdul-
Wahhab brought about change by emphasizing the very basics of the faith. The basis 
of the religion is the true monotheism (tauheed)”242. Along with the prominence of 
tawhid, Hiro believes that the socio-religious equality of its followers is one of the 
key characteristics of Wahhabi Islam
243
. Although Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s dawa drew 
on Islam’s early years for inspiration, it was by no means a backward-looking dawa; 
he did not call for the literal return to the time of the Prophet and his companions.  
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s interpretation of Islam has been attractive to a wide range of 
Muslims because of its simplicity, and it has been successful outside Saudi Arabia 
because of the combined impact of Saudi wealth and the apparent westernisation and 
secularisation spread through globalisation. These things have affected not only 
Wahhabism, but Islam more generally, inspiring various movements of Islamic 
revivalism, particularly in the salafi strain, since the second half of the twentieth 
century. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was just one of many important thinkers who have 
called for Muslims to return to the Islam and ummah of the salaf, and others who 
have shaped contemporary salafism include Muhammad Abduh, al-Afghani, Sayyid 
Qutb and Mawdudi. Some scholars believe that Wahhabism gave rise to Islamic 
fundamentalism
244
, and even that Wahhabism and salafism provide the ideological 
basis for global jihadism
245
, but there seems to be little within Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
teachings to suggest that it could inspire terrorism. Indeed, a search on the website 
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Minbar of Tawhed and Jihad
246
, one of the largest collections of jihadist literature 
online, returns no results where Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is referenced as a source of 
inspiration for jihadist activity. Similarly, when the vast majority of Wahhabis and 
salafis eschew violence, one must come to the conclusion that there are other factors 
which result in people resorting to terrorist activity. 
Migrants to Saudi Arabia during the 1960s and 1970s brought with them radical and 
even revolutionary thinking, in the shape of Qutbian ideology. This activism was 
taught in some Saudi institutions from the 1970s onwards, and appeared in contrast 
to the Wahhabi ulema, who were not only political quietist but rejected any form of 
mass political participation. While the aims of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Qutb were 
broadly the same, their methods varied considerably. For Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the 
most important aspect of theology was to develop a correct understanding of tawhid, 
while for Qutb it was to establish a social and political order in conformity with 
sharia
247
. While both men felt that Islam was in a state of jahiliyya
248
, in Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s lifetime this ignorance and corruption was caused by the influence of 
tribal practices on Islam, but for Qutb it stemmed from western influence on Muslim 
societies. Since Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not insist on the classical distinction 
between dar al-Islam and dar al-kufr
249
, a key component of ibn Taymiyya and 
Qutb’s doctrines, he believed that jihad should be strictly defensive in nature and 
begin with neighbouring areas. Qutb called for jihad on a global scale, since the very 
existence of jahiliyya societies necessitated a permanent state of jihad until sharia 
was implemented everywhere and peace would follow automatically
250
. Here then 
can clearly be found the intellectual roots of global jihadism. The need to fight both 
the near enemy in the guise of un-Islamic rulers of Muslim states, and the far enemy 
in the form of political, military and civilian targets, is characteristic of the al-
Qaeda-style terrorist organisations. Another key difference is that Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab decreed that only a ruler may instigate jihad, whereas modern terrorists 
assume the right to declare jihad themselves. Wahhabi attitudes towards jihad also 
tend to follow the classical model that only allows armed jihad in defence of religion 
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or religious freedom, and strictly condemns any attacks on civilians
251
. Elements of 
the conservatism of Saudi society and modern Wahhabi Islam, and the apparently 
extreme interpretations of tawhid and shirk could perhaps, in combination with other 
ideas, turn some Muslims to a more radical and exclusivist worldview. Yet it is most 
likely that the majority of these radicals would reject terrorism, preferring instead 
political dissent and non-violent activism. The ideologies of most contemporary 
terrorist groups are based on an amalgamation of Qutbian revolutionary thinking, the 
global jihadism of al-Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam, and the anti-Westernism and 
media-awareness of Osama bin Laden. 
When examining any links between Wahhabi Islam and violence, the context of 
Wahhabism’s development must be taken into account. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
alliance was with a military force which wanted to expand its control across the 
Arabian Peninsula, and inter-tribal fighting was also part of life in Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s time. Delong Bas has concluded that Wahhabism today is not about 
expansionism, since it follows Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teaching that jihad should be 
defensive in nature
252
. The violence of the Ikhwan and of al-Utaybi and his followers 
did not stem from pure readings of Wahhabi Islam; in both cases there were 
revolutionary characteristics which came from outside Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
doctrine, as well as aspects of tribal justice and mahdi theology. In the modern state 
of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabi Islam has actually been used to condemn violence and 
terrorism, both within and outside Saudi borders. Reflecting Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
assertion that guiding people to Islam is the most important and worthwhile of 
activities
253, Olivier Roy points out that “the priority of dawah over jihad is the 
watershed between mainstream neofundamentalists and radical groups. Most of the 
Wahhabi ulama...consider that jihad is not on the agenda, except for defense”254. 
While a few aspects of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine overlap with those expounded 
by some terrorists, these same ideas have also been present in the philosophies of 
many so-called ‘moderates’ as well as radicals, and no group has an ideology which 
is comprehensively the same as Wahhabi Islam. 
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Islam is not monolithic, and neither are its followers, and as such there is no single 
form of Islam which can be held accountable for the violence of a very small 
minority. Rather, the extremist ideologies of a few key thinkers seem to inform the 
worldview of most terrorist groups, but Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is not one of these. In 
modern Wahhabi Islam, which has not escaped the effects of globalisation, 
variations in belief and practice occur when external influences meet traditional 
Wahhabi ideas. Therefore, as both Islam and Wahhabism evolve, so too must our 
models of understanding; without an acceptance that Wahhabi Islam is not the static 
phenomenon it is often presented as, we will be unable to understand its relationship 
with other forms of Islam, and the complex role it has to play in both the Islamic 
milieu and the wider non-Islamic world. The continuing expansion of Wahhabi 
Islam, achieved with mainly Saudi financial backing, may potentially decrease 
pluralism within Islam if it takes the place of other, native forms of Islam. However, 
if as I believe, the theological ideas of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab are not inherently violent 
then they do not contribute to violent radicalisation or terrorist activity, and 
comparisons between Wahhabism and terrorist organisations demonstrate that 
Wahhabi theology has little or no connection with terrorism, on a global or domestic 
scale.  
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